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The Equal Protection Doctrine in the 
Age of Trump 
THE EXAMPLE OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT 
CHILDREN 
Rebecca A. Delfino† 
INTRODUCTION 
Nearly a century ago, Supreme Court Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr. described an equal protection claim as “the 
usual last resort of constitutional arguments.”1 Not anymore. In 
the last forty years, the “equal protection doctrine has become 
the Court’s chief instrument for invalidating . . . laws.”2 Now 
dawns a new era—the age of Trump—when the equal protection 
doctrine has greater significance, a broader application, and 
renewed utility to invalidate federal laws and executive actions 
that deny due process or discriminate. 
President Trump has made no secret of his desire to 
unwind policies of the prior administration in the areas of civil 
rights, voting rights, immigration, environmental protection, 
international relations, and health care.3 By the end of his first 
year in office, “approximately [thirty] major federal lawsuits were 
filed against the president and his administration challenging 
 
 † Clinical Professor of Law at Loyola Law School Los Angeles. I am grateful 
to my colleagues for their helpful comments, particularly Sande Buhai and Justin Levitt. 
I am also indebted to Nicholas Armer, Galen Bean, Chris Khasho and Gabrille Trujillo 
for their research assistance, Loyola Law School for its generous support of faculty 
scholarship, and as always, my family for their patience, indulgence and encouragement. 
This article is dedicated to the hundreds of thousands of immigrant children who have 
come to the United States alone without parents seeking a better life, including my late 
great-grandfather Giovanni Jelmini, Sr. who came to the United States alone as a 
teenager in 1911. 
 1 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
 2 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 3 See David Smith, The Anti-Obama: Trump’s Drive to Destroy His Predecessor’s 
Legacy, GUARDIAN, (May 11, 2018, 7:59 AM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/may/11/donald-trump-barack-obama-legacy [https://perma.cc/YP77-C43Q]; 
Donald Trump: Year One, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/issues/
executive-branch/donald-trump-year-one [https://perma.cc/6SBT-6C3S]. 
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[his executive orders or executive branch actions].”4 Specifically, 
equal protection claims appear in recent challenges to the 
executive branch’s actions related to the travel ban,5 transgender 
members of the military,6 the Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals program,7 efforts to eliminate benefits under the 
Affordable Care Act,8 and the “zero tolerance”9 immigration 
 
 4 See Norman Siegel, 2017: The Constitution, Federal Courts and President 
Trump, N.Y. L.J. (Jan. 9, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/sites/
newyorklawjournal/2018/01/09/2017-the-constitution-federal-courts-and-president-trump/ 
[https://perma.cc/7TEY-CK3L]. 
 5 President Trump’s initial immigration order banned travel and refugee 
admission from seven predominantly Muslim countries. See Exec. Order No. 13, 780, 82 
Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). Opponents of the ban claimed it violated equal 
protection (among other constitutional protections) by discriminating based on religion, 
even though the policy was facially neutral with respect to religion. See Washington v. 
Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2017) (describing equal protection claim 
against the travel ban in a case that was later rendered moot); see also Hawaii v. Trump, 
859 F.3d 741, 760 (9th Cir.), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 377, 377 (2017) (challenging 
Trump’s second executive order banning travel from predominantly Muslim countries). 
 6 See Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747, 753–57, 763, 765, 768 (D. Md. 
2017) (Transgender military service members’ claim that the Presidential Memorandum, 
which directed military to prohibit accession of transgender individuals to the military, 
authorize their discharge, and “generally prohibit expenditure of military resources on 
sex-reassignment surgeries for military personnel”, violated their equal protection rights 
because members alleged that directives “treated [them] differently from all other 
military service members,” and the “decision to exclude transgender individuals was not 
driven by genuine concerns regarding military efficacy.”). 
 7 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 298 F. Supp. 
3d 1304, 1313–15 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (equal protection challenge based on the government’s 
rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program). 
 8 See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 2, Medical Students 
for Choice v. Wright, No. 1:17-CV-02096 (D.D.C. dismissed Feb. 6, 2018), ECF No. 1, 
https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Complai
nt-Medical-Students-for-Choice-vs-Wright.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR3R-2ZKV]. This 
complaint, filed in late 2017 in the District of Columbia, challenged interim final rules 
the Trump administration implemented, which threatened to curtail access to birth 
control coverage for women by creating a broad exemption to the guarantee in the ACA 
of coverage for FDA-approved contraceptives without out-of-pocket costs. Id. The 
challenged interim rules enabled employers, health insurance providers, and 
universities claiming a religious or moral objection to deny their employees, students, 
and insurance beneficiaries coverage for contraception. Id. at 3. The plaintiffs argued the 
rules violated the Constitution’s Establishment Clause, the equal protection guarantee, 
and the fundamental right to contraception by imposing unreasonable burdens upon and 
unfairly targeting women. Id. at 3–4. 
 9 On April 6, 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced a new “zero-
tolerance” policy on the United States’ southern border. Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief at 15, Washington v. United States, No. 2:18-cv-00939 (W. Dist. Wash. 
2018), ECF No. 1. Instead of making case-specific evaluations of individual cases, 
respecting due process rights and family integrity, the Trump Administration began 
prosecuting all possible immigration crimes and detaining all accused adults—even 
those with legitimate asylum claims. Id. at 16. The intended and acknowledged effect of 
this policy has been the separation of children from their parents. Id. at 19–20. The 
Trump Administration has been clear that the purpose of the forced separation policy is 
not to protect children, but rather to deter potential immigrants from coming to the 
United States. Id. at 4. Although on June 20, 2018, President Trump signed an executive 
order that he claims ends the separations, it did not end the underlying policy. Exec. 
Order No. 13,841, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,435 (June 25, 2018). 
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policy.10 The federal courts appear ready, willing, and able to 
entertain these challenges.11 
This article explores the new frontier of potential equal 
protection challenges using federal immigration law as an 
example, specifically, the law governing Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status (SIJS).12 SIJS opens a pathway for 
undocumented immigrant children who are in the United States 
without a parent in order to obtain legal status. It is unique both 
in the context of immigration law and the general canon of 
federal law. The SIJS law embodies a bifurcated legal 
framework that requires SIJS applicants to apply first to the 
state courts to obtain predicate factual findings based on state 
family law, including findings that SIJS applicants cannot be 
reunified with a parent because of abuse, abandonment, or 
neglect, and that it would not be in the child’s best interest to be 
returned to their home country. If the SIJS applicants obtain the 
state court predicate findings, they must then apply to the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for approval, and if the 
applications are granted, the SIJS applicants obtain lawful 
permanent residence in the United States.13 
This shared role of state courts and federal agencies and 
their respective realms of authority under the SIJS law are 
ambiguous and susceptible to different and inconsistent 
interpretations. On occasion, the state courts have exceeded 
their authority and interpreted the SIJS statute to apply their 
own legal standards, which effectively prevents certain 
applicants from obtaining the requisite predicate findings.14 
Because DHS is not authorized to review a state court’s refusal 
to issue SIJS findings, this refusal results in the automatic 
denial of the application by DHS. Consequently, the availability 
of SIJS may depend on the state where the predicate findings 
are sought, rather than the merits of the application. As a result, 
similarly situated SIJS applicants in different states will obtain 
inconsistent outcomes. For these reasons, a state court’s denial 
of a request for predicate SIJS findings based on the state court’s  
 10 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 9 at 2, 115–
16 (state attorneys general of seventeen states challenge the Trump Administration’s 
policy of separating families crossing the nation’s southern border on the basis that the 
policy violates the Constitution’s guarantees of due process and equal protection); Teri 
Kanefield & Jed Shugerman, Trump’s Family Separations are Unconstitutional, SLATE 
(June 21, 2018, 5:33 PM) https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/trumps-family-
separation-policy-is-unconstitutional-its-time-for-the-courts-to-award-damages.html 
[https://perma.cc/F4C5-Y4A4]. 
 11 See Siegel, supra note 4. 
 12 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012). 
 13 See infra note 103. 
 14 See infra Sections III.A.1, III.A.2. 
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unique interpretation of federal law offends the Constitution’s 
guarantee of equal protection under the law. This article 
proposes that the only viable solution to remedy the problems 
that plague SIJS is a novel challenge to the SIJS law in the 
federal courts, asserting that the subsection of the law which 
empowers the state courts to make SIJS eligibility findings 
violates the equal protection guarantees included in the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the 
background and legal framework of the equal protection doctrine 
as it exists in the Fourteenth Amendment and as it has been read 
into the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. This Part also 
describes the development of equal protection jurisprudence in 
the context of immigration law. Part II explores the development 
of the law of SIJS. It begins with a brief history of unaccompanied 
children immigrating to the United States before the enactment 
of SIJS in 1990, as well as the trends in the migration of 
unaccompanied children and changes to the SIJS law over the last 
twenty-seven years. This Part also highlights the significant legal 
and prudential problems with SIJS. Solutions to the problems 
with the SIJS legal framework previously proposed in the 
academic scholarship, including proposals to amend SIJS and its 
governing regulations, are also identified and deconstructed. This 
Part concludes by explaining that given the current political 
climate in the federal executive and legislative branches, none of 
the previously proposed fixes or changes to SIJS will be 
implemented, and thus a new approach is required. 
Part III explores how the SIJS legal framework deprives 
SIJS applicants of equal protection and offers as an example the 
Nebraska and California courts’ respective interpretations of the 
SIJS statute to demonstrate how SIJS denies equal protection. 
This Part also describes the proposed remedy—a challenge to 
the SIJS law in the federal courts—asserting that the law 
violates the equal protection guarantees included the the 
Federal Constitution. This Part also argues why this unique 
equal protection challenge will likely succeed. 
Finally, Part IV ponders why an equal protection challenge 
to the SIJS legal framework has not previously been suggested in 
the legal academic scholarship or pursued in the courts. This Part 
asserts that in light of the federal courts’ increasing willingness to 
entertain equal protection challenges against the actions of the 
current presidential administration, the time has come for a full-
scale equal protection challenge to the SIJS law. 
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I. BACKGROUND AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION DOCTRINE 
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause 
The Declaration of Independence’s proclamation that “all 
men are created equal” memorialized for the first time on the 
American continent an idea of equality that has ancient origins 
in Western civilization.15 The idea of equality under the law—
that every similarly situated person should be treated the same 
by the government—appears in American history to have first 
passed from the aspirational to the juridical in the 1850s.16 
Fifteen years later, in the aftermath of the Civil War, 
Congress proposed “equal protection” of the law in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, which embodied the new and 
radical idea17 that a state shall not “deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.”18 It appears that the 
catalysts for passage of the Fourteenth Amendment were a desire 
to explicitly and deliberately reject the constitutional order 
described in Chief Justice Taney’s Dred Scott opinion19 and 
replace it with one that was in all respects its opposite.20 The 
 
 15 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also James 
Sullivan, The Antecedents of the Declaration of Independence, 1 ANN. REP. AM. HIST. 
ASS’N 80 (1902); FRANCIS D. WORMUTH, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
ch. 2 (1949). The values of freedom and equality have ancient roots: Cicero considered 
liberty and equality to be necessary complements to each other in a free society of equal 
citizens. See MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, THE REPUBLIC THE LAWS bk.1.47, p.21 (Niall 
Rudd trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998). 
 16 See Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 201–05 (Mass. 1849) (Charles 
Sumner’s argument against school segregation); see also John P. Frank & Robert F. 
Munro, The Original Understanding of “Equal Protection of the Laws,” 50 COLUM. L. 
REV. 131, 138–40 (1950), updated and reprinted in 1972 WASH. U. L. REV. 421. 
 17 See Henry Steele Commager, Equal Protection as an Instrument of Revolution, 
in CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 467 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 1980). 
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (The first section of the amendment offered 
“equal protection of the laws”: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”). The amendment also answered the citizenship question 
for African-Americans after the Civil War. “All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States . . . are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” Id. And 
it extended “due process” to the states, not just the federal government. Id. 
 19 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404–05, 416 (1857). In 
Dred Scott, Justice Taney had written that black people had not been included in “[We 
the P]eople of the United States” because they were “considered as a subordinate and 
inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether 
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority.” Id. at 404–05. 
 20 See Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12–16 (1977); see also 
JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 201 (First Collier Books 1965). But see WILLIAM 
E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL 
DOCTRINE 40–63 (Harv. Univ. Press, 1988) (arguing that Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is ambiguous, the product of the framers’ political compromises, and that its 
specific legal meaning and impact was only emergent). On passage of the Fourteenth 
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amendment was also motivated by the framers’ fear that 
important Reconstruction laws might be invalidated on the 
grounds that Congress exceeded its authority in enacting them.21 
Since the term had no significant history before 
incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment, the original 
understanding and intent of “equal protection” are difficult to 
discern and have led to debates about its meaning.22 For 
instance, Congress gave the amendment’s entire first section, in 
which the Equal Protection Clause is found, little attention.23 On 
the one hand, moderates in Congress wanted to limit the rights 
protected to the “civil rights” enumerated in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, such as the right to contract and hold property.24 In 
contrast, more progressive members of Congress sought broader 
coverage that could expand with changing circumstances.25 
Scholars of congressional history have suggested that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was amenable to several interpretations.26 
First, that its immediate object was the protection of specific “civil 
rights” without contemplation of such changes in the social 
order as desegregation would entail; and second, that a more 
expansive interpretation is required given the general language 
 
Amendment, see generally HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (William S. Hein & Co.,1908); JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (D. Philip Locklin et al. eds., 1956); JOURNAL OF THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONG., 1865–1867 (B. Kendrick ed., 
1914). On the framing of the Equal Protection Clause specifically, see ROBERT J. HARRIS, 
THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS, & THE SUPREME COURT 32–33 
(La. State Univ. Press ed., 1960) (explaining that Congressional Representative John A. 
Bingham led the drive for the Fourteenth Amendment, first proposing it in January 1866); 
TENBROEK, supra note 20 at 207 (explaining that in every subsequent draft, the objective 
of guaranteeing “equal protection” never changed). Congress passed the amendment in 
June 1866, and ratification was completed in 1868. NELSON, supra note 20, at 58–60. 
 21 See e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. The Act’s constitutional 
validity had been challenged by Andrew Johnson in his veto message and by 
conservatives of both parties in Congress. See Karst, supra note 20, at 14. Contemporary 
concepts of equality before the law, understood in the privileges and immunities context, 
were most fully captured in the 1866 Civil Rights Act. That measure, enacted as its title 
proclaimed “to protect all Persons in the United States in their civil rights,” first 
conferred national citizenship. 14 Stat. 27. It then affirmed that all citizens “shall have 
the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, 
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property” as whites. 
Id. The law also protected the rights of contract, property, and juridical capacity (as 
witness and party) of those citizens. Id. 
 22 See Frank & Munro, supra note 16, at 138–42; see also Alexander M. Bickel, The 
Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1, 31–33 (1955). 
 23 Bickel, supra note 22 at 47–48.  
 24 Id. at 56; see also Lewis Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, The Supreme 
Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 95–103 (1968) (analyzing the Court’s examination 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866’s legislative history in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 
409 (1968) regarding “private discrimination in the sale or rental of property”). 
 25 Bickel, supra note 22, at 62–63. 
 26 See id. at 59–63. 
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of the Equal Protection Clause, which on its face was not 
limited to racial discrimination.27 
Likewise, the understanding and application of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has continued 
to evolve and expand in the last 150 years since it was adopted. 
It has played a starring role in some of the most prominent cases 
of the last century—cases which have had a profound influence 
not only on how Americans are treated by the government, but 
also on how Americans perceive themselves and treat others. In 
the 1873 decision of the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme 
Court stated that the Equal Protection Clause was “clearly a 
provision for [the African-American] race” and that it did not 
apply to economic affairs.28 By 1886, however, as reflected in the 
Court’s decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, such a limited 
construction of the Fourteenth Amendment had disappeared.29 
Supreme Court decisions soon after recognized a more flexible 
and broad approach to the Equal Protection Clause. The Court 
not only applied the Equal Protection Clause to other racial 
groups but also extended it to economic affairs by allowing a 
corporation to assert the right.30 
Thereafter, in 1896, the Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson, 
considered one of first landmark cases to test the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.31 In Plessy, the Supreme 
Court said segregation was constitutionally acceptable as long as 
the facilities were equal.32 This “separate but equal” mantra 
facilitated the birth of the Jim Crow South, in which everything 
from water fountains to public schooling were legally segregated. 
Nearly sixty years later, in 1954, the Supreme Court used 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
revisit segregation. In Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
the Court decided that Kansas’ “[s]eparate educational facilities 
are inherently unequal,” and thus violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.33 The ruling overturned Plessy and forced desegregation. 
The Supreme Court has continued to utilize a broader 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause in different factual  
 27 Id. at 60–63. 
 28 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873). 
 29 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 373–74 (1886) (the first case in which 
the Supreme Court struck down a facially neutral municipal ordinance based on its 
discriminatory, disparate impact on resident alien Chinese business owners, recognizing 
that non-citizens were entitled to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 30 See id. at 368; see also Pembina Consol. Silver Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 
125 U.S. 181, 188–89 (1888) (finding private corporations are “persons” under the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 31 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896). 
 32 Id. at 544. 
 33 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
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contexts over the past century. For example, in Bush v. Gore, 
amid the Florida recount that would decide the presidential 
election of 2000, George W. Bush’s lawyers successfully argued 
that the recount of presidential ballots ordered by the Florida 
courts violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause because different standards of counting were used in 
different counties.34 Likewise, the Supreme Court applied the 
Equal Protection Clause in Obergefell v. Hodges to strike down 
states’ facially neutral same-sex marriage bans in 2015.35 In its 
equal protection analysis, the Court was troubled by same-sex 
marriage bans’ adverse impact on gays and lesbians.36 Justice 
Anthony Kennedy invoked the equal protection portion of the 
amendment to assert that it “prohibits this unjustified infringement 
of the fundamental right to marry.”37 And in the last year, the Court 
decided the race discrimination case of Cooper v. Harris, in which 
the Court found that lawmakers were impermissibly motivated by 
race when they drew legislative districts.38 
To be sure, the central requirement of the Equal 
Protection Clause—requiring states to treat their citizens 
equally—has remained unchanged from its earliest, limited 
applications in the area of racial discrimination in the 1880s to 
its expansion in the 2000s to other classes of individuals who, 
though not expressly singled out under the law, have suffered 
from its disparate impact. Over time, “[j]udges deciding cases 
under the Equal Protection Clause have . . . defined . . . ‘equal 
treatment’” differently for different classifications of individuals.39 
In all instances, however, an equal protection violation may be 
found where, depending on the level of scrutiny applied to the 
law,40 the discrimination cannot be justified. The common thread 
 
 34 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100, 104–07 (2000) (per curiam). 
 35 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015). 
 36 See id. at 2601–08. 
 37 Id. at 2604. 
 38 Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1481–82 (2017) (finding that lawmakers 
improperly packed black voters into a few legislative districts to diminish the power of 
black voters). 
 39 LENORA M. LAPIDUS, EMILY J. MARTIN, & NAMITA LUTHRA, THE RIGHTS OF 
WOMEN: THE AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE TO WOMEN’S RIGHTS 2 (2009) 
https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/about/rightsofwomen_chapter1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5
QJ-NYX5] (internal quotations omitted) (explaining that although a state may not pass 
laws that treat racial groups unequally, the state can discriminate based on certain 
classifications such as age “if [it has] a rational reason for doing so”). 
 40 Traditionally, courts have applied three degrees of scrutiny in analyzing 
challenged statutes under the Equal Protection Clause: “strict scrutiny,” “intermediate” 
or “heightened” scrutiny, and “rational review.” See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–18 
nn.14–16. (1982); the choice among the three levels depends upon the nature of the 
statute in question. If the legislative classification on its face or as applied disadvantages 
a “suspect class” or impinges upon the exercise of a “fundamental right,” then the courts 
employ strict scrutiny. Id. at 216–17. The statute will fail unless the government can 
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running through all of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause jurisprudence—from Plessy to Harris—is that 
the actor is the “state.” 
B. Equal Protection Under the Fifth Amendment 
On its face, the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to 
“state” actions; it does not constrain actions by the federal 
government.41 In fact, no provision in the Federal Constitution 
expressly requires the federal government to secure equal 
protection for its citizens.42 Consequently, the Court has looked 
elsewhere—specifically to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause—to find the basic right of equals to equality under federal 
law. Chief Justice Taft spearheaded the effort to root equal 
protection within due process when, in 1921, he wrote that the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses are “associated” and may 
“overlap” in that a violation of one clause violates the other.43 He 
further observed that although the Due Process Clause “secure[s] 
equality of law in the sense that it makes a required minimum of 
protection for everyone’s right of life, liberty and property . . . . [o]ur 
whole system of law is predicated on the general, fundamental 
principle of equality of application of the law.”44 
 
demonstrate that the “classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest.” Id. at 217. If the “classification, while not facially invidious, 
nonetheless give[s] rise to recurring constitutional difficulties,” it will be tested under 
intermediate scrutiny. Id. Such difficulties arise, for example, when a statute 
discriminates against a class which shares some of the characteristics of the suspect 
classes. See id. at 218–23; see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977); 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1090 (1st ed. 1978). To withstand 
intermediate scrutiny, the statutory classification “must serve important governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216; Lalli v. Lalli, 
439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978). If neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny is appropriate, then 
the statute will be tested for mere rationality—that the classification at issue bears some 
fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216. 
 41 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”) (emphasis added); 
see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“The Fifth Amendment . . . does not 
contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies 
only to the states.”). 
 42 See Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943) (“Unlike the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth contains no equal protection clause and it provides no 
guaranty against discriminatory legislation by Congress.”) see also Helvering v. Lerner 
Stores Corp., 314 U.S. 463, 468 (1941). 
 43 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 331–32 (1921). 
 44 Id. at 332; see also Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937) 
(“[W]e assume that discrimination, if gross enough, is equivalent to confiscation and 
subject under the Fifth Amendment to challenge and annulment.”). 
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Thirty years later, the Court had another opportunity to 
recognize equal protection principles in the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause in connection with the school desegregation 
cases. In Bolling v. Sharpe, for example, a companion case to 
Brown v. Board of Education, the Court held that the equal 
protection principles of Brown would apply to District of 
Columbia schools through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.45 Specifically the Court noted that the concepts of “equal 
protection and due process, both stemming from our American 
ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive,” and although “‘equal 
protection of the laws’ is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited 
unfairness than ‘due process of law’. . . . discrimination may be so 
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.”46 Indeed, after 
Bolling, the Court has consistently reiterated that equal 
protection analysis embedded in the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause is the same as that under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.47 The Court has thus applied much of its 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection jurisprudence to strike 
down sex classifications in federal legislation,48 overturn 
classifications with an adverse impact upon illegitimate 
 
 45 Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (“Equal protection analysis in the 
Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638, n.2 (1975) (“This Court’s approach to Fifth 
Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal 
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975); Jimenez v. 
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973). 
 48 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686, 1690, 1698 (2017) 
(invalidating gender-based distinction applicable to acquisition of United States citizenship 
by child born abroad to one parent who was United States citizen and another parent who 
was citizen of another nation, under which only one year of continuous physical presence 
was required before unwed mothers could pass citizenship to their children, but five years 
of continuous physical presence were required of unwed fathers); accord Tuan Anh Nguyen 
v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 57, 60 (2001) (involving a Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge 
to a federal gender classification with differing rules for unwed mothers and for unwed 
fathers in their ability to confer derivative citizenship); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 
84, 88–89 (1979) (holding unconstitutional provision of unemployed-parent benefits 
exclusively to fathers); see also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 206–07 (1977) (plurality 
opinion) (holding unconstitutional a Social Security classification that denied widowers 
survivors’ benefits available to widows); Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 648–53 (1975) (holding 
unconstitutional a Social Security classification that excluded fathers from receipt of child-
in-care benefits available to mothers); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688–91 (plurality opinion) 
(holding unconstitutional exclusion of married female officers in the military from benefits 
automatically accorded married male officers); cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74, 76–77 
(1971) (holding unconstitutional a probate-code preference for a father over a mother as 
administrator of a deceased child’s estate). 
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children,49 and invalidated some welfare assistance provisions.50 
Almost all legislation, however, involves some degree of 
classification among particular categories of persons, things, or 
events. Just as the Equal Protection Clause does not outlaw 
“reasonable” classifications, the Due Process Clause is no more 
tolerant of the great variety of social and economic legislation 
typically containing what must be arbitrary line-drawing.51 As 
the next section will explore, the federal government has 
historically been endowed with some authority to classify 
persons upon certain grounds. 
C. The Equal Protection Doctrine in the Immigration Law 
Context 
The application of equal protection principles grounded 
in the Fifth Amendment has salience in the context of 
immigration law because the federal government has exclusive 
regulatory authority over immigration, citizenship, and 
alienage.52 As the Court has observed, “[t]he federal sovereign, 
like the States, must govern impartially. . . . [B]ut . . . there may 
be overriding national interests which justify selective federal 
legislation that would be unacceptable for an individual State.”53 
Historically, the Supreme Court deferred to the federal 
government in the realm of immigration.54 This power to 
 
 49 Compare Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 637 (holding unconstitutional a Social 
Security classification denying benefits to one subclass of illegitimate children), with 
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 512–16 (1976) (holding the same Social Security 
classification did not unconstitutionally discriminate by withholding a presumption of 
dependency to one subclass of illegitimate children). 
 50 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973); see also U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973). 
 51 Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 642–43 (1986) (food Stamp Act limitation of 
benefits to households of related persons who prepare meals together held constitutional); 
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971). With respect to courts and criminal 
legislation, see United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 324 (1976); Marshall v. United 
States, 414 U.S. 417, 428–30 (1974); Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 590 (1973). 
 52 See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) (immigration and alienage are 
the exclusive province of the federal government, and therefore states may not regulate 
or criminalize matters related to immigration or alienage). 
 53 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976). Thus, the power over 
immigration and aliens permitted federal discrimination on the basis of alienage. Id. at 
100–01 (employment restrictions like those previously voided when imposed by States); 
see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85–87 (1976) (permitting discrimination on the 
basis of durational residency); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798–99 (1977) (allowing 
discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy). Similar rules by States would be voided. 
 54 Indeed, as early as May 1889, the Supreme Court ruled that “[t]he power of 
exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty . . . cannot be granted away or 
restrained.” Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 
581, 609 (1889). Later during the Cold War, the Court reaffirmed the plenary power 
doctrine by holding that “it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly 
authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government 
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regulate immigration and naturalization is the principal 
example of the national government’s ability to classify upon 
some grounds—alienage, but also other suspect and quasi-
suspect categories as well—that would result in invalidation 
were a state to enact them.55 
 Traditionally, the courts divided immigrants into 
“two . . . categories: (1) lawful permanent residents . . . (immigrants 
who have been granted permission to live and work in the United 
States), and (2) inadmissible aliens (non-citizens who entered the 
country without authorization or who are otherwise ineligible to 
enter the country or remain).”56 The government has typically 
granted lawful permanent residents “greater rights and privileges” 
than those granted to inadmissible aliens.57 Thus, what appears in 
the context of immigration law is a sliding scale of rights, greatest 
in a naturalized citizen and least in a non-resident, non-citizen 
without any immigration status. In between these two are 
numerous other categories including those who are permanent 
legal residents,58 who have “rights” that are “more extensive and 
 
to exclude a given alien.” United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 
(1950). More recently, in February 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit held that “a nation-state has the inherent right to exclude 
or admit foreigners and to prescribe applicable terms and conditions for their exclusion 
and admission.” Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 559 
U.S. 131 (2010). The principle “to decide which alien may, and which alien may not, enter 
the United States, and on what terms,” Judge Randolph firmly asserted, “has been a 
matter of political determination by each State—‘a matter wholly outside the concern 
and competence of the [j]udiciary.’” Id. at 1026 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 
U.S. 580, 596 (1952)) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 55 “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment’s limits on state powers are substantially 
different from the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over 
immigration and naturalization.” Mathews, 426 U.S. at 86–87. That is so, because “it is the 
business of the political branches of the Federal Government, rather than that of. . . the 
States . . . to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens.” Id. at 84. 
 56 Andrew Bramante, Note, Ending Indefinite Detention of Non-Citizens, 61 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 933, 938 (2011) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). 
 57 Id.; see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 389 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“[C]onstitutional questions raised by detaining inadmissible aliens are 
different from those raised by detaining admitted aliens.”) (emphasis omitted); Johnson 
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (“The alien, to whom the United States has been 
traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as 
he increases his identity with our society. Mere lawful presence in the country creates 
an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him certain rights.”). Lawful permanent 
residents have the right to live and work permanently in the United States and “[b]e 
protected by all laws of the United States . . . state[s] . . . and local jurisdictions.” Rights and 
Responsibilities of a Green Card Holder (Permanent Resident), U.S. CUSTOMS & 
IMMIGRATION SERVICES (July 15, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/after-green-
card-granted/rights-and-responsibilities-permanent-resident/rights-and-responsibilities
-green-card-holder-permanent-resident [https://perma.cc/9S7X-WAHU]. 
 58 In In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721–22 (1973) and Graham v. Richardson, 
403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971), the Court subjected state laws disadvantaging legal aliens to 
strict scrutiny. In Graham, the Court struck down a law that conditioned the payment 
of state welfare benefits on citizenship. 403 U.S. at 374–75. Preserving limited state 
resources for citizens was not found to be a sufficiently compelling interest. Id. In 
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secure” because the person has made a “preliminary declaration of 
intention to become a citizen.”59 Since immigration laws tend to 
single out and discriminate against people based on their ethnic, 
national origin or cultural status, the Supreme Court has often 
scrutinized the laws under the equal protection framework.60 
The tension between protecting the rights of the 
discriminated against “other” and safeguarding national security 
and national sovereignty is on display at the intersection of 
immigration and the equal protection doctrine. For example, in 
Hirabayashi v. United States, the Court upheld federal military 
orders regarding Japanese internment, concluding that although 
such orders discriminated against citizens of Japanese ancestry, 
they did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.61 In Hirabayashi, 
the Court recognized that “[d]istinctions between citizens solely 
because of their ancestry are, by their very nature odious to a free 
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. 
For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on 
race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection.”62 
Nonetheless, the Court also found no equal protection violation 
given the government’s interest in securing the country during 
wartime, concluding that “the challenged orders and statute 
afforded a reasonable basis for the action taken.”63 
Undocumented immigrants have also challenged laws 
under the Equal Protection Clause with varying degrees of 
success.64 For example, in Plyler v. Doe, a case examining the 
legality of a school admission policy that restricted the 
registration of children of undocumented immigrants, the Court 
ultimately struck down the restrictions as violating equal 
protection.65 The Court, however, initially dismissed the idea that 
undocumented aliens were a suspect class, which would warrant 
heightened review. Specifically, the Court held that an 
individual’s undocumented status did not permit the same level 
 
Griffiths, the Court considered a state law that restricted bar membership to citizens. 
413 U.S. at 724. Again, a majority of the Court applied strict scrutiny to strike down 
the law, finding citizenship to not be closely related to one’s ability to fulfill the 
responsibilities of a lawyer. Id. 
 59 Johnson, 339 U.S. at 770. 
 60 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210–11 (1982). 
 61 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100–01 (1943). 
 62 Id. at 100. 
 63 Id. at 100–01. For its part, the Hirabayashi Court relied on Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). In Yick Wo, the Court held that “any person” in the text 
of the Fourteenth Amendment was “universal in [it’s] application to all persons . . . without 
regard to any differences of . . . nationality.” Id. 
 64 See e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (involving a successful 
challenge based on equal protection to a law that excluded children of undocumented 
immigrants from public education). 
 65 Id. at 230. 
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of constitutional protections afforded to legal residents.66 
Therefore, it seemed that the Plyler Court had decided to apply the 
less demanding rational basis review. This notwithstanding, the 
Plyler majority emphasized that the class at issue was the children 
of undocumented immigrants, not just undocumented immigrants 
in general.67 The Court stated that the state’s exclusion of these 
children from educational opportunities “impos[ed] a lifetime 
hardship on a discrete class of children,” who were in a particularly 
vulnerable position through no fault of their own.68 The Court, 
therefore, required the state to point to a “substantial goal” 
furthered by the law to justify the discrimination.69 Although the 
Supreme Court explicitly stated that it would use rational basis 
review, the “substantial goal” language implied that the Court was 
applying some form of heightened scrutiny.70 
Plyler has particular relevance to an examination of the 
treatment of undocumented juveniles seeking SIJS and the 
impediments they face navigating the SIJS legal framework, as 
discussed in Part II. Additionally, as asserted in Part III, Plyler 
provides significant support to the proposed cure to SIJS’s endemic 
problems—an equal protection challenge to the SIJS law. 
II. THE SIJS EXAMPLE 
A. Unaccompanied Immigrant Children in the United 
States Before 1990 and the Laws that Affected Them 
Children have been immigrating to the United States 
without parents or guardians at least as early as 1892 when Ellis 
 
 66 Id. at 219–20. 
 67 Id. at 220. 
 68 Id. at 223–24. 
 69 Id. at 224. 
 70 Id. In addition to the language in Plyler acknowledging that undocumented 
children were “persons” entitled to equal protection, the Plyler Court also introduced the 
idea that undocumented children are particularly vulnerable and thus the laws that 
discriminate against them are subject to some level of judicial scrutiny higher than 
rational basis. Id. at 223–24. The framework of providing heighten protections to 
undocumented minors that Plyer introduced has been successfully used to challenge 
state laws that target them. For example, Alabama enacted HB 56, the “Alabama 
Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act,” in 2011, which “required schools to conduct a 
census of undocumented children in schools, until it was enjoined by the trial and circuit 
judges.” Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 ALA. 
LAWS 535 (H.B. 56); Michael A. Olivas, Undocumented Children 30 Years After Plyler, 
AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/undocumented-
children-30-years-after-plyler/ [https://perma.cc/XR9Q-WDYY]. In addition, Plyer, and 
its result of opening the public schools to undocumented children, has been credited with 
generating wide-spread acceptance of undocumented children and motivating such 
legislation as the DREAM act. See id. 
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Island began processing immigrants.71 For the next one hundred 
years, hundreds of thousands of unaccompanied children, or 
unaccompanied alien children (UAC) as they are characterized 
under the law,72 have come to the United States to escape war, 
famine, and poverty from crisis-ridden areas around the world.73 
In that process they have been aided by charities, immigrant aid 
societies, and sometimes even the United States government.74 
 
 71 See Sam Roberts, Story of the First Through Ellis Island Is Rewritten, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 14, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/14/nyregion/14annie.html 
[https://perma.cc/7MNY-LPJT]. An unaccompanied child named Annie Moore was the 
first immigrant to step off the first ship that brought immigrants to Ellis Island on January 
1, 1892, the day it initially opened. Id. Annie was awarded a $10 gold liberty coin for being 
the first to register. Id. Most unaccompanied children, however, came to the United States 
in less desirable circumstances, and many were turned away. See Tasneem Raja, Child 
Migrants Have Been Coming to America Alone Since Ellis Island, MOTHER JONES (July 18, 
2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/07/child-migrant-ellis-island-
history [https://perma.cc/BG4L-Z23M]. Unaccompanied children who were determined to 
come to the United States but were unable to purchase ship tickets often stowed away by 
hiding in the various inconspicuous areas of ships. Id. Henry Armetta was a famous actor 
in Hollywood’s golden age who came to America from Italy stowed away on a ship bound 
for Ellis Island in 1902. Id. Armetta was not sent back to Italy because a local Italian offered 
to sponsor him. Id. Not all stowaways managed to remain in the United States, even the 
most persistent ones. See, e.g., Sam Apple, The Boy Who Was Desperate to Be an 
American, L.A. TIMES (July 5, 2014, 12:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-oe-
apple-axelrod-immigrant-minor-stowaway-20140706-story.html [https://perma.cc/48ZY-
HXVU]. For example, twelve-year-old Benjamin Axelrod reportedly stowed away on ships 
bound for New York seven times over the course of two years and was sent back each time. 
Id. 
 72 Under 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2012), “unaccompanied alien child” is defined as a 
child that: 
(A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States; (B) has not attained 
18 years of age; and C) with respect to whom (i) there is no parent or legal 
guardian in the United States; or (ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United 
States is available to provide care or physical custody. 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2205 (2002) (codified 
as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 279(g) (2012)). 
 73 Daniel J. Steinbock, The Admission of Unaccompanied Children into the 
United States 7 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 141–42 (1989). 
 74 BARRY MORENO, IMAGES OF AMERICA: CHILDREN OF ELLIS ISLAND 7–8 (Arcadia 
Publishing 2005). Charitable sponsors often purchased bonds, which allowed the children to 
be admitted to the United States. See id. at 8. For instance, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid 
Society purchased bonds for Jewish children whose parents were killed by anti-Semitic 
pogroms in Eastern Europe. See Tasneem Raja, Child Migrants Have Been Coming to 
America Alone Since Ellis Island, MOTHER JONES (July 18, 2014, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/07/child-migrant-ellis-island-history [https://
perma.cc/BG4L-Z23M]. The oppression of the Jews in Germany in the years preceding 
and during World War II also sparked multiple organizations to rescue Jewish children from 
Nazi persecution. Jewish Aid & Rescue, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM: HOLOCAUST 
ENCYC., https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/jewish-aid-and-rescue [https://
perma.cc/N5SQ-4EGG]. The largest immigration of unaccompanied children into the United 
States prior to 2000 occurred in the 1960’s during what is now known as ‘Operation Pedro 
Pan’ when over 14,000 unaccompanied children were admitted to the United States. History, 
OPERATION PEDRO PAN GROUP, INC. (2009), http://www.pedropan.org/category/history 
[https://perma.cc/54AJ-TKEH]. When diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba 
were broken, unaccompanied Cuban children fled, and were sent by their parents on 
commercial flights to the United States, Florida in particular. Id. At the time, the U.S. 
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Since the arrival of the first UAC, various laws have 
affected the status of these children. The Immigration Act of 
1907 placed “all children under sixteen years of age, 
unaccompanied by one or both of their parents” on a list of 
excluded immigrants.75 In an apparent attempt to relax the 
exclusion of unaccompanied children, the Immigration Act of 
1917 provided that children whose parents were already in the 
United States were no longer excluded, and gave the Secretary 
of Labor discretion to admit unaccompanied children if “in his 
opinion they are not likely to become a public charge and are 
otherwise eligible.”76 In 1940, Congress passed a law allowing 
authorized American rescue ships to save refugee children from 
war zones and bring them to the United States on the condition 
that there was an American person or corporation ensuring that 
the child did not become a public charge.77 Then, in 1947, 
Congress adopted the Constitution of the International Refugee 
Organization, which included a provision that unaccompanied 
children under the age of sixteen “who are war orphans or whose 
parents have disappeared, and who are outside their countries 
of origin, shall be given all possible priority assistance.”78 In 
1953, Congress passed a law to allow non-quota immigrant visas 
to be issued to “eligible orphans” under ten years old, which 
allowed them to be adopted from abroad.79 The Refugee Act of 
1980 created the Office of Refugee Resettlement within the 
 
Department of State encouraged the children to come by waiving visa requirements for 
these children. Id. 
 75 Immigration Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-96, 34 Stat. 898, 898–99. In addition to 
unaccompanied children the act sets forth additional exclusions, such as: (a) persons deemed 
to have physical or mental defects that might affect their ability to support themselves; (b) 
persons infected with tuberculosis; and (c) so-called “feeble minded” persons. Id. at 898. 
 76 Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat 874, 876. 
 77 Act of Aug. 27, 1940, ch. 695, Pub. L. No. 76-776, 54 Stat. 866, 866 (amending 
Neutrality Act of 1939). 
 78 Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, opened for signature 
Dec. 15, 1946, annex I, pt. I, § A, 62 Stat. 3037, 3050, 18 U.N.T.S. 18 (entered into force 
Aug. 20, 1948). 
 79 Act of July 29, 1953, ch. 268, Pub. L. No. 83-162, 67 Stat. 229, 229. Eligible 
orphan is defined in part as a child who has experienced the death, abandonment, or 
disappearance of one or both parents, and the remaining parent is incapable of caring 
for the child and “irrevocably release[s] the child for emigration and adoption.” Id. In 
1957, Congress amended the act to, among other things, increase the age of eligible 
orphans to fourteen years old and allow visas to be issued until June 30, 1959. See Act 
of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639, 639. Congress later amended the act 
in 1959 to extend the term whereby visas could be granted to immigrant orphans to June 
30, 1960. See Act of Sept. 9, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-253, 73 Stat. 490, 490. In 1961, Congress 
permanently permitted adoption of eligible children under the age of fourteen by U.S. 
Citizens. See Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650, 650. In 1981, the 
age of eligible orphans was raised to sixteen years old. Immigration and Nationality Act 
Amendments of 1981, § 2(b), Pub. L. No. 97-116, 95 Stat. 1611, 1611 (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012)). 
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Department of Health and Human Services and detailed 
procedures and programs to help with refugees’ interactions 
with the government.80 The history of the last century—prior to 
1990—shows a progressive federal legal and regulatory approach, 
reflecting clear, open pathways for admission to the United States 
for these unaccompanied children. 
B. The Immigration of Unaccompanied Immigrant 
Children After 1990 and Emergence of SIJS 
1. The Roots of SIJS and Its Evolution to the Present 
Originally enacted as a part of the Immigration Act of 
1990,81 the Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS),82 a 
seemingly minor and uncontroversial addition to the landscape 
of immigration law, created a pathway to permanent legal status 
for certain undocumented immigrant children who had become 
dependent on a state’s juvenile courts and for whom return to 
their country of origin would not be possible. The provision 
stated two basic requirements for SIJS: (1) that the immigrant 
child “has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located 
in the United States and has been deemed eligible by that court 
for long-term foster care;” and (2) that it is not “in the [child’s] 
best interest to be returned to the [child]’s or parent’s previous 
country of nationality or country of last habitual residence.”83 
 
 80 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 111–18 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1521–1524 (2012)). 
 81 The Act amended key components of the original 1965 Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“the INA”) and was intended to be a broad and sweeping update to the 
systems and processes the United States used to legally admit immigrants and to 
administer the naturalization of immigrants. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012)). 
 82 Id. § 153, 104 Stat. 4978, 5005–06; 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2018). 
 83 § 153, 104 Stat. at 5005–06. In 1991, Congress passed a series of technical 
amendments to the INA that explicitly waived these and other grounds of inadmissibility 
that presented unintended obstacles to SIJS applicants. See Miscellaneous and 
Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 102-232, 
sec. 302, 105 Stat. 1733, 1742–46 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h) (2012)). The 
1990 amendments also designated SIJS applicants as being deemed paroled into the 
United States, effectively avoiding the immigration consequences that would normally 
flow from being present in the United States without ever having been legally admitted. 
Id.; see also Special Immigrant Status; Certain Aliens Declared Dependent on a Juvenile 
Court; Revocation of Approval of Petitions; Bona Fide Marriage Exemption to Marriage 
Fraud Amendments; Adjustment of Status, 58 Fed. Reg. 42,843, 42,844–50 (Aug. 12, 
1993) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (1993)). Lastly, the 1991 amendments stated 
unequivocally that nothing in either the SIJS statute or these new amendments 
permitted an alien to be admitted into the United States, or apply for admission, for the 
purpose of obtaining SIJS. sec. 302, 105 Stat. at 1745. The legislative materials and 
conference reports accompanying the 1991 legislation are silent as to the purpose for 
including the prohibition against permitting an alien to be admitted into the United 
States, or to apply for admission, for the purpose of obtaining SIJS. However, the 
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The creation of SIJS was a response to a growing humanitarian 
concern over the welfare of undocumented children, who had been 
victims of parental abandonment, abuse, or neglect,84 that began 
to immigrate to the United States at the end of the last century.85 
The SIJS statute sought to address this humanitarian concern in 
two ways: first by creating a path to permanent residency for 
these children, and second by including a standard that required 
a determination of whether deportation of the child back to their 
home country or previous country of residence would really serve 
the best interests of the child.86 Given, however, that the federal 
court system has no family law courts, Congress delegated to 
state courts the duty to render the juvenile dependency and best 
interest of the child determinations.87  
 
Congressional Research Service commentary regarding the purpose behind the enactment 
of the 1991 Amendment indicates that the text of the original statute contained a type of 
loop-hole that would potentially permit an immigrant to apply for and obtain admission 
into the United States explicitly for the purpose of obtaining SIJS. See RUTH WASEM, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R43703, SPECIAL IMMIGRATION JUVENILES: IN BRIEF 3 (2014). 
 84 § 153, 104 Stat. at, 5005–06; see also Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
119, sec. 113. 111 Stat. 2440, 2460; Angela Lloyd, Regulating Consent: Protecting 
Undocumented Immigrant Children from their (Evil) Step-Uncle Sam, or How to 
Ameliorate the Impact of the 1997 Amendments to the SIJ Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J., 
237, 240, 245 (2006); WASEM, supra note 83, at 3. 
 85 Beginning in the 1990s, large numbers of unaccompanied children came to the 
United States came from Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. See WILLIAM A. 
KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43599, UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN: AN 
OVERVIEW 1–3 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43599.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YBM-
4P55]. Like their counterparts in the last one hundred years, UAC are escaping “[h]igh 
violent crime rates, poor economic conditions fueled by relatively low economic growth 
rates, relatively high poverty rates, and the presence of transnational gangs” in their 
countries of origin. WILLIAM A. KANDEL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43628, 
UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN: POTENTIAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO RECENT 
IMMIGRATION 3 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43628.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RF5-
B9GJ]. Out of the nine sectors of the Southwest border that the United States Border Patrol 
monitors, the overwhelming majority of UAC arrive in the Southwest sector. See Statement 
by Secretary Johnson on Southwest Border Security, United States Border Patrol 
Southwest Family Unit Subject and Unaccompanied Alien Children Apprehensions Fiscal 
Year 2016, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.cbp.gov/
newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2016 [https://perma.cc/
MT5N-2BFC] In total, from 2008 through August 2016, at least 277,798 UAC were 
encountered by United States Border Patrol. See id. In the first two years of the Trump 
administration, apprehension of undocumented individual and family units by the Board 
Patrol has increased overall, with more 80,000 apprehensions of UAC from the fall of 2016 
through the end of July 2018. See U.S. Southwest Border Migration FY 2018, U.S. CUSTOMS 
& BORDER PROTECTION (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-
migration [https://perma.cc/BJ6U-SGR6]; U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border 
Apprehensions by Sector FY 2017, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/usbp-sw-border-apprehensions-fy2017 [https://
perma.cc/42HY-8JU8]. 
 86 § 153, 104 Stat. at 5005–26; see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c) (2018). 
 87 Neither the legislation itself, nor the accompanying conference report 
contain any commentary explaining Congress’ purpose behind the enactment of SIJS. 
The Congressional Research Service and scholarly commentary regarding the purpose 
behind the enactment of SIJS consistently agree, however, that the purpose for having 
the State courts render the juvenile dependency determinations was to leverage the child 
2018] SIJS IN THE AGE OF TRUMP 91 
By the late 1990s, however, a concern emerged among 
lawmakers that parents were purposely abandoning their 
children so they could obtain SIJS.88 As a result, Congress 
amended the act to specify in the first requirement that the child 
is “eligible . . . for long-term foster care due to abuse, neglect, or 
abandonment.”89 In 1997, Congress added a third requirement 
making it necessary that the Attorney General consent90 to the 
dependency order.91 The Homeland Security Act of 200292 shifted 
most enforcement responsibilities from the Department of 
Justice’s INS to the Department of Homeland Security.93 
Furthermore, in 2006, Congress supplied the guideline that a child 
should never be compelled to contact their alleged abuser in 
applying for SIJS, sacrificing efficiency for the welfare of the child.94 
In 2008, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), which applied directly to UAC and 
set out detailed rules, policies, and guidelines that also amended 
 
welfare expertise that state courts already possessed, which the federal government 
lacked. See, e.g., WASEM, supra note 83, at 3; Jessica R. Pulitzer, Note, Fear and Failing 
in Family Court: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status and the State Court Problem, 21 
CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 201, 212 (2014); see also Lloyd, supra note 84 at 243. It is worth 
noting that standards based on the best interests of the child are not new in American 
family law courts, and states apply a “best interests of the child” standard when making 
determinations on a citizen child’s custody or placement with a guardian, for example. 
See Pulitzer, supra note 87, at 202–03. 
 88 By 1997, there was a growing concern in Congress, championed by former 
Arizona Senator Peter Domenici, that college age Mexican nationals were abusing SIJS 
to gain lawful permanent residency, so they could attend United States colleges and 
universities. See Lloyd, supra note 84, at 239 n.12, 244 n.44. That year, Congress 
addressed those concerns by passing the first significant amendments to the statutory 
language that created SIJS. Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, Act of Nov. 26, 
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, sec. 113, 111 Stat. 2440, 2460–61; H.R. REP. NO. 105-405, at 
130 (1997) (Conf. Rep.); see also WASEM, supra note 83, at 3. 
 89 Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat. 2440, 2460 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2012)). 
 90 The 1997 amendment divided “consent” into “express” consent for 
undocumented juvenile immigrants that were not in the custody of the federal 
government, and “specific” consent for undocumented juvenile immigrants that were in 
federal custody. Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, sec. 113, 111 Stat. at 2460 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii) (2012)). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 462, 116 Stat. 2135, 
2202–05 (2002) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 279 (2012)). 
 93 Id.; see also WASEM, supra note 83, at 3 n.3. DHS was not, however, 
transferred the responsibility for the custody and care of unaccompanied immigrant 
children. Instead the Homeland Security Act gave those responsibilities to the Office of 
Refugee Resettlement (ORR) within the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS). Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 462 116 Stat. at 2202–05 (codified as amended 
at 6 U.S.C. § 279 (2012)); see also Lauren R. Aronson, The Tipping Point: The Failure of 
Form over Substance in Addressing the Needs of Unaccompanied Immigrant Children, 
18 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 8 (2015). 
 94 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960, 3066 (2006) (codified as amended at 
8 U.S.C. § 1357(h) (2012)). 
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SIJS eligibility requirements.95 First, TVPRA replaced the 
requirement that the juvenile is deemed eligible for long-term foster 
care with the requirement that “reunification with [one] or both of 
the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, 
abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law.”96 The 
TVPRA also amended the SIJS statute and gave consent authority 
for undocumented immigrant children not in federal custody to the 
Secretary of DHS (rather than the Attorney General), while giving 
“specific[ ] ” consent authority for undocumented immigrant children 
in federal custody to the Secretary of Health and Human Services.97 
Additionally, the statute now permitted a grant of SIJS even in 
situations where reunification with one parent presented no risk of 
abuse, abandonment, or neglect, so long as reunification with the 
other parent was not viable for those reasons.98 Finally, the inclusion 
of “similar basis found under state law” language eliminated the 
unnecessarily restrictive requirement that SIJS was only available 
in cases specifically of abandonment, abuse, and neglect.99 
SIJS was now also available to undocumented immigrant 
children that were the victims of behavior similar to abandonment, 
abuse, or neglect—behavior that the state would normally remove 
children from to protect them.100 The TVPRA also added a 
requirement that all SIJS applications be adjudicated by DHS 
within 180 days of the date upon which the application was filed 
with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). 
It clarified that any undocumented immigrant who was a “child” 
on the date his or her SIJS application was filed could not be denied 
SIJS regardless of his or her age at the time of adjudication.101 
Thus, Congress effectively broadened the scope of people eligible 
for SIJS at a time when there was an increasing number of UAC 
 
 95 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235, 122 Stat 5044, 5074–82 (2008) (codified as amended at 
8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2012)). 
 96 Id. at 5079. The requirement necessitating eligibility for long-term foster 
care was added in 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2018). In order to be eligible, children must satisfy 
the requirements in both the statute and regulations. § 235, 122 Stat. at 5080. 
 97 Section 235, 122 Stat. at 5079–80. More significantly, the TVPRA dramatically 
altered the consent practice by eliminating the need for “express[ ] ” consent “to the 
dependency order serving as a precondition to the grant” of SIJS. Id. Instead, DHS consent 
for undocumented immigrant children would function as acknowledgement that the SIJS 
request was being sought for the purpose of escaping abandonment, abuse, neglect, and not 
for the purpose of gaining legal status. Id. at 5079. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See id; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2012). 
 100 See § 235, 122 Stat. at 5079. 
 101 Id. at 5080. 
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arriving in the United States.102 Today, SIJS remains substantially 
the same as it was when amended in 2008.103 
 
 102 Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir. of Domestic 
Operations, USCIS, Pearl Chang, Acting Chief of Office of Policy & Strategy to Field 
Leadership (Mar. 24, 2009), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memo
randa/Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/TVPRA_SIJ.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WS5-9ZRG]. 
 103 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012). It provides: 
(27) the term “special immigrant” means— 
 (J) an immigrant who is present in the United States— 
(i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United 
States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the 
custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity 
appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States, and whose 
reunification with [one] or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to 
abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law; 
(ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial proceedings 
that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or 
parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence; 
and 
(iii) in whose case the Secretary of Homeland Security consents to the grant of 
special immigrant juvenile status, except that— 
 (I) no juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine the custody status or 
placement of an alien in the custody of the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services specifically 
consents to such jurisdiction; and 
 (II) no natural parent or prior adoptive parent of any alien provided 
special immigrant status under this subparagraph shall thereafter, by virtue 
of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this 
chapter. 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012). The governing regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c) (2018), 
prescribe: 
An alien is eligible for classification as a special immigrant under section 
101(a)(27)(J) of the Act if the alien: (1) Is under twenty-one years of age; (2) Is 
unmarried; (3) Has been declared dependent upon a juvenile court located in 
the United States in accordance with state law governing such declarations of 
dependency, while the alien was in the United States and under the 
jurisdiction of the court; (4) Has been deemed eligible by the juvenile court for 
long-term foster care; (5) Continues to be dependent upon the juvenile court 
and eligible for long-term foster care, such declaration, dependency or 
eligibility not having been vacated, terminated, or otherwise ended; and (6) 
Has been the subject of judicial proceedings or administrative proceedings 
authorized or recognized by the juvenile court in which it has been determined 
that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the country of 
nationality or last habitual residence of the beneficiary or his or her parent or 
parents; or (7) On November 29, 1990, met all the eligibility requirements for 
special immigrant juvenile status in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(6) of this 
section, and for whom a petition for classification as a special immigrant 
juvenile is filed on Form I-360 before June 1, 1994. 
8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2018); see also Eligibility Status for SIJ, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGRATION SERVS. (July 5, 2011), https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/special-immigrant-
juveniles/eligibility-sij-status/eligibility-status-sij [https://perma.cc/BA84-27Z3]. 
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2. The Problems with SIJS 
SIJS creates a bifurcated state-federal structure and thus 
represents a novelty in federal immigration law in that it expressly 
requires input and participation from state courts.104 As a result, 
certain aspects of the SIJS framework and the unique state-federal 
structure have impeded SIJS applicants from obtaining SIJS 
protection, therefore making the entire framework susceptible to 
scrutiny and criticism from immigration lawyers and scholars. 
Immigration legal scholars have thoroughly and 
thoughtfully documented the systemic problems with the SIJS 
framework, which create unsurmountable obstacles for UAC to 
obtain SIJS. These problems include: (1) no right to appointed 
counsel and the general lack of affordable, competent immigration 
lawyers;105 (2) conflicts between and diffusion of SIJS responsibilities 
among federal agencies tasked with administering SIJS;106 (3) the 
lack of adequate guidance to the federal authority responsible for 
granting consent;107 (4) the application of “privileged, American 
parenting standards” which fail to account for familial situations 
that may exist “in . . . different socio-economic circumstances” in 
other countries;108 (5) the failure to expressly recognize poverty 
alone as a legitimate “basis for children seeking a better life in the 
United States”;109 and (6) conflicts within DHS itself as the agency 
 
 104 See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (2018). 
 105 See Laila L. Hlass, States and Status: A Study of Geographical Disparities 
for Immigrant Youth, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 266, 267 (2014); Elizabeth Keyes, 
Evolving Contours of Immigration Federalism: The Case of Migrant Children, 19 HARV. 
LATINO L. REV. 33, 38, 82–83 (2016); Randi Mandelbaum & Elissa Steglich, Disparate 
Outcomes: The Quest for Uniform Treatment of Immigrant Children, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 
606, 613 (2012); M. Aryah Somers et al., Constructions of Childhood and Unaccompanied 
Children in the Immigration System in the United States, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & 
POL’Y 311, 363 (2010); David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the 
Experiences of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 TEX. HISP. J. L. & 
POL’Y 45, 63 (2005) [hereinafter Thronson, Of Borders]; David B. Thronson, Thinking 
Small: The Need for Big Changes in Immigration Law’s Treatment of Children, 14 U.C. 
DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 239 (2010) [hereinafter Thronson, Thinking Small]; Pulitzer, 
supra note 87, at 207. 
 106 See Keyes, supra note 105, at 71–72; see also Bijal Shah, Uncovering 
Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805, 823 (2015). 
 107 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649 § 153, 104 Stat. 4978, 5005 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(2012)); see 
also Act of Nov. 26, 1997, P.L. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat 2440, 2460 (1997) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2012)); William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235, 122 Stat. at 5079; 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-405, at 130 (1997) (Conf. Rep.); Lloyd, supra note 84, at 239–40. 
 108 Sarah Rogerson, The Politics of Fear: Unaccompanied Immigrant Children 
and the Case of the Southern Border, 61 VILL. L. REV. 843, 886–87 (2016). 
 109 Id. at 887. 
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attempts to simultaneously enforce the removal of undocumented 
children and provide them with a legal path to residency.110 
This “disparate geographic access to SIJS, with [the] 
uneven [availability of] relief [within state] jurisdictions,” has also 
been thoroughly explored in legal scholarship.111 Several scholars 
have studied the ways that SIJS availability varies between states. 
Professor Laila Hlass, in particular, has examined statistics to 
illustrate the tremendous geographic disparity in accessing SIJS.112 
These disparities are attributed to factors including variance in 
child welfare policies and practices among states, in addition to 
differing state laws, which gives rise to divergent state court 
definitions of SIJS eligibility terms based on state law.113 Others 
writing on this issue have focused on statutory differences, such as 
the age limit for state court jurisdiction over minors,114 as well as 
case law differences.115 
Among the landscape of commentary on the problems that 
plague SIJS, this article is the first to argue that the SIJS legal 
framework, which has allowed state courts broad authority to 
adjudicate SIJS disparately, presents significant equal protection 
concerns, and makes the law ripe for an equal protection challenge. 
As discussed in Part III, the decisions by the state courts in 
Nebraska and California interpreting the plain language of the 
SIJS statute demonstrate this problem adroitly. 
3. Sensible Remedies and Why They Will Now Fail 
The United States’ need for an effective program to address 
unaccompanied, undocumented, minor victims of abuse has only 
grown in the twenty-seven years since the inception of SIJS. Not 
only would such a program serve the best interests of these children 
by protecting them from abusive family situations, but it would also 
serve the best interests of the United States. Humanitarian 
interests would be served by embracing this largely faultless and 
 
 110 See Keyes, supra note 105, at 71. 
 111 Id. at 38. 
 112 See Hlass, supra note 105, at 266–67. As Professor Keyes has observed: 
“Professor Hlass’s research both ties into the descriptive understanding of the problems 
of state court adjudications, and documents one aspect of the federalism problems in the 
current system.” Keyes, supra note 105, at 38 n.11. 
 113 Id.; see also Pulitzer, supra note 87, at 214–22 (exploring in detail the 
problems among and within states in defining and applying “abuse, abandonment and 
neglect;” “best interest” standards, as well as the other required eligibility standards). 
 114 Heryka Knoespel, Note, Special Immigration Justice Status: A “Juvenile” 
Here is Not a “Juvenile” There, 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 505, 519–20 
(2013) (addressing the state juvenile court’s efforts to resolve the challenges faced by 
eighteen through twenty-one-year-old SIJS applicants in obtaining SIJS findings). 
 115 Pulitzer, supra note 87, at 217–18. 
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highly vulnerable undocumented immigrant population; 
furthermore, economic interests would be served by integrating 
these individuals legally into society, allowing them to both 
contribute to and reap the rewards of the most powerful economy on 
Earth. Unfortunately, the SIJS program in its current iteration is 
simply not up to the task, and the bifurcated structure of state and 
federal roles, which may have made sense when SIJS was first 
implemented, now impede the program’s success. 
 a) Proposed Congressional and Executive Branch 
Solutions 
Scholars writing in this area have proposed sensible 
solutions to the problems with SIJS. Many focus on ways to 
improve procedures in the state courts or recalibrate the amount 
of deference given to state courts’ determinations.116 Professor 
Hlass, who extensively documented the differences among state 
court applications under SIJS, recommends fixes such as 
“forming a working group to analyze SIJS application disparities 
and state practices; . . . enacting [new] federal law[s] to increase 
state screening and assistance for immigrant children to apply 
for SIJS; and . . . amending SIJS to create a federal safeguard to 
address state discrepancies.”117 Other possible proposals include 
legislative amendments to SIJS to “creat[e] redundant 
jurisdiction” so that if SIJS applicants are unable to obtain SIJS 
findings from state court, they can seek review and intervention 
from the federal government.118 Professor Elizabeth Keyes 
proposes a comprehensive reconsideration of the allocation of 
power under SIJS and recommends eliminating the state’s role 
in making SIJS determinations. Accordingly, she urges “making 
SIJS a purely federal immigration process, with a dedicated, 
centralized corps of decision-makers akin to the Crime Victims 
Unit or the Asylum Corps.”119 
Another possible solution that does not rely on 
congressional action could originate within the DHS, which could 
use the federal rulemaking process to revise SIJS regulations 
 
 116 See generally Hlass, supra note 105; Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 105, 
at 606; Pulitzer, supra note 87, at 217; Somers et al., supra note 105, at 317; Thronson, Of 
Borders, supra note 105, at 48; Thronson, Thinking Small, supra note 105, at 240–41. 
 117 See Hlass, supra note 105, at 329. 
 118 Keyes, supra note 105, at 85. Professor Keyes discusses, as an alternative, a 
review “process [similar to] that [which] currently exists for T visas, where victims must 
attempt to get a law enforcement certification that they cooperated in[ ]  an investigation 
of human trafficking but can also show USCIS evidence of their efforts to cooperate if 
law enforcement refuses to issue a certification for them.” Id. 
 119 See id. at 86–88. 
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concerning the definition of “juvenile court” to provide a federal 
department, such as DHS, discretion to achieve the same ends.120 
Finally, other administrative fixes for SIJS could be addressed 
through the Administrative Appeals Office review process.121 
Amending SIJS or revising its implementing regulations, as 
suggested here and in other scholarship, would significantly 
improve the SIJS framework and resolve the problems that impede 
equal access to SIJS. These ideas have much to commend them, 
and in a different political climate with different leadership in the 
federal government they might have come to pass. In the current 
political environment, however, those remedies are only aspirations. 
 b) All of the Solutions Will Fail: The Lack of the 
Political Will to Improve the SIJS Law 
Despite the clear need for reform to SIJS demonstrated in 
this article and in the other legal academic literature, the 
necessary reforms to SIJS will not occur in the near term. The 
current President and others in his administration are openly 
hostile to most immigration policies, particularly policies regarding 
illegal immigrants, as evidenced in the Executive Orders banning 
 
 120 DHS could revise the definition of “juvenile court” found in 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.11(a), which provides “[s]pecial immigrant status for certain aliens declared 
dependent on a juvenile court.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2018). For the purposes of SIJS, “juvenile 
court” currently “means a court located in the United States having jurisdiction under 
State law to make judicial determinations about the custody and care of juveniles.” Id. DHS 
could amend the SIJS regulation definition of juvenile court to include, “under federal” or 
state law. With this change, Federal courts with the jurisdiction to make judicial 
determinations about the custody and care of juveniles would have the same authority to 
grant SIJS dependency and custody orders that state courts have now. This would likely 
include USCIS immigration courts that make judicial determinations about juvenile 
refugees and juvenile victims of human trafficking and would certainly include the AAO 
which has authority to review certain denied immigration petitions involving children. See 
The Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (July 
11, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/directorates-and-program-offices/administrative
-appeals-office-aao/administrative-appeals-office-aao [https://perma.cc/A3CX-RR8J]. 
 121 The current SIJS framework allows for applicants denied SIJS to appeal the 
denial to the AAO within USCIS. See The Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), supra 
note 120. A judge at the AAO then reviews the denial “to ensure consistency and accuracy 
in the interpretation of immigration law and policy” and has the authority to reject the 
denial where USCIS improperly applied the law. Id. If the denial of SIJS is rejected, the 
judge can issue a precedent decision that becomes binding federal precedent for all future 
cases (anywhere in the federal government) involving the same or similar facts. See id. 
Precedent decisions are very rare, and they require the Secretary of DHS to directly 
petition the Attorney General to approve the AAO decision as binding legal precedent 
for the entire federal government. See id. “[P]recedent decisions may announce new legal 
interpretations or agency policy, or they may reinforce existing law and policy by 
demonstrating how it applies to a unique set of facts.” Id. In the entire twenty-seven-
year history of the SIJS program, there has never been a precedent decision that deals 
with SIJS. DHS/AAO/INS Decisions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.
justice.gov/eoir/dhs-aao-ins-decisions [https://perma.cc/D7LZ-DS7D]. 
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immigrants from certain countries;122 the lack of commitment to 
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals recipients;123 the efforts 
to deprive so-called sanctuary cities of federal funding;124 the 
recommendations to allow the National Security Agency to conduct 
mass surveillance and create a racial profiling database;125 and the 
implementation in the spring of 2018 of the “zero tolerance” 
policies, which resulted in the mass separation of undocumented 
children and their families.126 Furthermore, President Trump has 
consistently exhibited hostility towards undocumented 
immigrants in public statements and Tweets.127 With respect to 
SIJS, President Trump said that he would like to further limit the 
“unaccompanied” status.128 Therefore, SIJS applicants have no 
champions in the executive branch. 
Likewise, since the 2016 election some Members of 
Congress, in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, 
have been equally hostile to immigrants, while those in the 
legislative branch who support undocumented immigrants have 
been unable to effectively challenge the opposition or the president 
on immigration issues.129 The distance between Republican and 
 
 122 See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Exec. Order 
13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
 123 See Katie Reilly, Here’s What President Trump Has Said About DACA in the 
Past, TIME (Sept. 5, 2017), http://time.com/4927100/donald-trump-daca-past-statements/ 
[https://perma.cc/72DN-FRLY]. 
 124 Ruthie Epstein, Trump and Sessions Keep Trying to Institute Anti-
Immigrant Policies, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Nov. 17, 2017, 4:45 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/trump-and-sessions-keep-trying-institute-
anti-immigrant-policies [https://perma.cc/3YAB-VK5M]. 
 125 AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, THE TRUMP MEMOS: THE ACLU’S CONSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND POLICY PROPOSALS OF DONALD TRUMP 11–14 
(2016), https://www.aclu.org/report/trump-memos [https://perma.cc/4HW3-JFE6]. 
 126 See Katie Rogers & Sheryl G. Stolberg, Trump Calls for Depriving 
Immigrants Who Illegally Cross Border of Due Process Rights, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/24/us/politics/trump-immigration-judges-due-
process.html [https://perma.cc/2BJ9-FGGL]. 
 127 In June 2018, after signing an executive order aimed at preventing 
additional family separations of undocumented children from their parents, President 
Trump tweeted those who cross into the United States illegally should be sent back 
immediately without due process or an appearance before a judge. See id.; see also Amrit 
Cheng, Trump’s Lawyers Say the Muslim Ban Has No Bias, but His Tweets Show 
Otherwise, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION: SPEAK FREELY BLOG (Nov. 30, 2017, 3:00 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/trumps-lawyers-say-muslim-ban-has-no-
bias-his-tweets-show-otherwise [https://perma.cc/GU9G-EY69] (discussing President 
Trump’s outward hostility toward Muslim immigrants).  
 128 See Sarah Gonzalez, What it Means That Trump Wants to Limit 
‘Unaccompanied’ Status for Minors Crossing the Borders, WNYC (Mar. 8, 2017), 
http://www.wnyc.org/story/unaccompanied-children-face-trump-proposals-immigration-
protections/ [https://perma.cc/HRE3-4TLH]. 
 129 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Thomas Kaplan, Congress Struggles for Path 
Forward on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/
16/us/politics/congress-immigration-dreamers.html [https://perma.cc/TW8K-HJTL]. 
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Democratic positions and their unwillingness to compromise 
suggests that Congress will not reform SIJS.130 
Thus, in the near term, any relief for SIJS applicants will 
not originate from the executive branch or Congress; neither will 
act to fix SIJS. Accordingly, SIJS applicants and their advocates 
must now look to the courts to compel action. 
III. THE PROPOSAL: A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 
It is clear that the problem of UAC is not going away 
anytime soon. Since 2013, a surge of unaccompanied children 
have come to the United States escaping poverty, conflict, crime 
and violence from their families and home countries;131 their 
desperate efforts to cross the border (and sometimes several 
borders) represent an ongoing humanitarian crisis.132 Prior to 
the passage of SIJS in 1990, states could render the child of 
undocumented immigrants a dependent of the state in the face 
of parental abandonment, abuse, or neglect; however, the child 
could not engage in any activities requiring citizenship or lawful 
status, including gainful employment.133 No immigration 
mechanism existed that could take the minor’s full situation into 
account when determining his or her undocumented status.134 
After undergoing removal proceedings, the child would ultimately 
have to return to a country he or she often had no real connection 
to.135 As discussed in preceding sections, the federal government’s 
solution was to create SIJS, a program that could provide these 
vulnerable victims a path to legal, permanent residency.136 Unlike 
nearly every other immigration law and federal initiative, 
however, SIJS granted the states a core “gatekeeping role” in 
granting immigration benefits to these children.137 This current 
 
 130 See id.; see also Ashley Killough & Tal Kopan, Here Are the Key Players in 
Congress on Immigration, CNN (Jan. 11, 2018, 10:08 AM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2018/
01/11/politics/key-players-immigration-congress/index.html [https://perma.cc/S4B4-B96Z]. 
 131 See supra note 85. 
 132 “From October of 2016 through February of 2017, Border Patrol 
apprehended 27,591 unaccompanied children—an average of nearly [two hundred] 
children per day.” Karen Coates, Crossing The Border As an Unaccompanied Child, PAC. 
STANDARD (May 24, 2017) https://psmag.com/social-justice/crossing-the-border-as-an-
unaccompanied-child [https://perma.cc/D52T-PZDN]. Although the total number of 
apprehensions in the Southwest border have dropped since President Trump took office, 
they nonetheless still remain in the hundreds of thousands. See U.S. Southwest Border 
Migration FY 2018, supra note 85. Apprehensions represent a fraction of the total 
number of individuals crossing the border. 
 133 See WASEM, supra note 83, at 2; Keyes, supra note 105, at 45. 
 134 See WASEM, supra note 83, at 2; see also Lloyd, supra note 84, at 240–41, 241 n.18. 
 135 Lloyd, supra note 84, at 41. 
 136 See infra Section II.B. 
 137 Keyes, supra note 105, at 58. 
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SIJS state-federal power-sharing framework is overly complicated; 
it is often unpredictable and sometimes broken. Depending on the 
state where the applicant seeks predicate findings, some applicants 
will be denied all access to SIJS because certain state courts have 
created insurmountable legal barriers in order to obtain the 
predicate findings.138 
It is likewise apparent that the reasonable fixes to SIJS 
proposed in legal scholarship will not come to fruition.139 They are 
workable and well-taken, but in light of the current executive 
branch’s implementation of anti-immigrant policies and the 
polarization of Congress, these solutions represent a Sisyphean140 
exercise. The only foreseeable path forward is full-throated, 
vigorous legal assaults on SIJS in the courts. A Fifth Amendment’s 
due process equal protection claim, although novel in this context, 
is the appropriate vehicle to transport this challenge.141 
 
 138 See Hlass, supra note 105, at 321; see also Keyes, supra note 105, at 43; 
Lloyd, supra note 84, at 255, 260–61. 
 139 See supra Section II.B.3. 
 140 In Greek mythology Sisyphus was the king of Ephyra. Sisyphus believed 
that his cleverness surpassed that of Zeus. As punishment for his self-aggrandizing 
actions and beliefs, Zeus required him to push an immense boulder up a steep hill. When 
Sisyphus and the boulder neared the top, the boulder would roll back down the hill. 
Sisyphus could never complete the task, and thus he was consigned to an eternity of 
useless efforts and unending frustration. Sisyphus, GREEKMYTHOLOGY.COM, 
https://www.greekmythology.com/Myths/Mortals/Sisyphus/sisyphus.html 
[https://perma.cc/VD5Y-PV7Z]; see also Sisyphean, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/180455?redirectedFrom=sisyphean#eid 
[https://perma.cc/W99X-4FDD]. Activities that are both laborious and futile have since 
come to be characterized as “Sisyphean.” Id. 
 141 The exact contours of the lawsuit alleging the equal protection challenge 
proposed here and the possible remedies are beyond the scope of this article and warrant 
further exploration and discussion. Nonetheless, in general, when confronted with a 
constitutional flaw in a statute, the courts attempt to limit the solution to the problem. 
For example, courts may enjoin only the unconstitutional applications of a statute while 
leaving other applications in force, see United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20–22 (1960), 
or to sever its problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact, see United States 
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–49 (2005). 
  Consequently, in challenging SIJS in the federal court, possible approaches 
might include a request to enjoin the enforcement of the law in those states where 
applicants have been denied SIJS findings based on the state overstepping its limited role 
and invading the province of the federal government in the SIJS application process. In the 
alternative, a plaintiff might argue that the language in section 1101 (a)(27(J)(i), which 
authorizes the state courts to make SIJS eligibility findings, violates equal protection. 
Rather than nullify the entire SIJS framework, plaintiffs might invite the court to excise 
that section from the statute. Under either approach the court could order the DHS to 
revise the existing regulations and work with the DOJ to develop a method to continue to 
implement SIJS while using exclusively federal decision makers or processes, and thereby 
salvage the law and honor the intent of the legislature to provide SIJS. 
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A. The SIJS Legal Framework Deprives Applicants of 
Equal Protection 
As explained above, the Equal Protection Clause requires 
that the government treat individuals equally.142 Equal 
protection problems are present in the very DNA of SIJS, which 
requires the applicant to apply to the appropriate state court and 
obtain certain predicate factual findings based on state law. 
After that, the applicant must then apply to DHS, which will 
ultimately determine whether to grant SIJS status based on 
that state court’s findings.143 By design, SIJS’s bifurcated state 
and federal power-sharing arrangement contains blurred 
boundaries, and thus contains space for the state courts to 
overstep their role—to interpret and possibly misconstrue the 
federal law. If (and when) that occurs, the values of equal 
protection are offended because the availability of SIJS will then 
depend on the state where the predicate findings are sought, 
rather than on the merits of the application. 
As discussed below, some states have overstepped their 
limited role of answering predicate state law matters and 
invaded the province of the federal government by interpreting 
the SIJS law to determine whether applicants meet the 
requirements for SIJS status.144 Two states, specifically 
Nebraska and California, are discussed below because they 
present clear case studies of state courts surpassing the 
authority granted in the SIJS framework to infringe on the 
province of the federal government. 
1. Nebraska’s Interpretation of Federal Law: A 
Requirement that the State Court Find the Child 
Cannot Reunify with Both Parents 
The SIJS statute requires a state court finding that 
“reunification with [one] or both . . . parents is not viable due to 
abuse, neglect, abandonment.”145 The Nebraska Supreme Court in 
In re Erick M., interpreted the “[one] or both” language in SIJS.146 
Erick M. sought SIJS findings during his delinquency proceeding 
and argued that although he was planning to reunite with his 
mother,147 he was nonetheless eligible for SIJS findings because his 
 
 142 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 143 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012). 
 144 See infra Sections III.A.1., III.A.2. 
 145 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012)(emphasis added). 
 146 In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 647 (Neb. 2012). 
 147 Id. 
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father had abandoned him.148 The Nebraska delinquency court 
refused to issue special findings that would enable Erick M. to 
apply for SIJS based on his father’s abandonment because he had 
not also shown that he was abused, abandoned, or neglected by his 
mother. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed this decision.149 
Although the plain language of the SIJS statute permits the state 
court to make the requisite findings when the abuse, 
abandonment, neglect or other stipulation is by one or both 
parents, the state argued that “Erick’s interpretation render[ed the 
‘or both’] superfluous,” thus making the statute ambiguous.150 
Concluding that one-parent abandonment was insufficient to 
establish SIJS eligibility, the Nebraska Supreme Court agreed 
with the state and held that “when ruling on a petitioner’s motion 
for an eligibility order under § 1101(a)(27)(J) [the SIJS provision in 
the Immigration and Nationality Act], a court should generally 
consider whether reunification with either parent is feasible” and 
that abuse, abandonment, or neglect by both parents was a 
requisite for special findings.151 
After the Supreme Court of Nebraska decided Erick M., 
family law courts in New York152 and New Jersey153 agreed with 
the Nebraska Supreme Court’s interpretation of the “one or both” 
language, while California courts soundly rejected it.154 The 
 
 148 Id. at 643. 
 149 Id. at 648. 
 150 Id. at 643. 
 151 Id. at 648 (emphasis added) (citing In re Luis G., 764 N.W.2d 648 (Neb. Ct. 
App. 2009)). 
 152 See, e.g., In the Matter of Fernandez, NN-9132/22, NYLJ 1202584001199, at 
1 (Fam. KI, Decided Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202584
001199?slreturn=20141006234750 [https://perma.cc/4SC7-SCWU] (“Emanuel ha[d] only 
had one parent, his mother. He cannot be ‘reunified’ with a parent he has never 
met. . . . [T]his Court [located in Kings County, New York] concurs with the reasoning In 
Erick M., supra, regarding the statutes [sic] use of the word ‘or’ in the phrase 
‘reunification with one or both parents.’”). But see, e. g., Diaz v. Munoz, 989 N.Y.S.2d 53, 
54 (App. Div. 2014) (Youth in question was eligible for SIJS special findings because of 
abandonment by her father, even though the youth “had never met her father”); In re 
Karen C., 973 N.Y.S.2d 810, 812 (App. Div. 2013) (holding that a child met the statutory 
requirements when her father, but not her mother, had abandoned her); Marcelina M.-
G. v. Israel S., 973 N.Y.S.2d 714, 722 (App. Div. 2013) (holding that the plain language 
of the statute only requires that one parent abused, abandoned or neglected the child 
when both did not); In re Mario S., 954 N.Y.S.2d 843, 852 (Fam. Ct. 2012) (granting 
motion for predicate findings where “the father has abandoned the child, and his 
reunification with his mother [was] tenuous given her apparent immigration status”). 
 153 See H.S.P. v. J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 266 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (“We 
agree with the holding of the Nebraska court, and overrule the contrary holding.”), rev’d, 
121 A.3d 849, 859 (N.J. 2015) (rejecting the lower court’s interpretation of the “[one] or 
both” language to require findings as to both parents). 
 154 See, e.g., Eddie E. v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773, 779 (Ct. App. 
2015) (a literal interpretation of the statute allows SIJS findings when only one parent 
abused, abandoned, or neglected the child); see also In re Israel O., 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 548, 
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concern here is not which construction is the correct 
interpretation of federal law. Instead, the problem is that these 
state courts are engaged in statutory interpretation of federal 
immigration law in the first instance, in addition to the fact that 
states are making divergent pronouncements about the federal 
law that are conclusive155 and binding on the SIJS applicants 
within their respective jurisdictions. This circumstance raises the 
possibility that similarly situated SIJS applicants might be 
subjected to different interpretations of the federal law (and 
therefore different treatment) in other states, which renders the 
SIJS framework problematic under the equal protection doctrine. 
2. California’s Interpretation of Federal Law: A 
Requirement that the State Court Determine that 
the Child’s Request for SIJS Findings is “Bona Fide” 
The California state courts, like the courts of Nebraska, 
have also endeavored to interpret SIJS in a manner that raises 
due process equal protection concerns. Specifically, in Bianka M. 
v. Superior Court,156 a juvenile filed a parentage action in a 
California family court requesting an order “to place her in the 
sole legal and physical custody of her mother and to make the 
additional findings necessary to allow her to petition for 
SIJ[S].”157 The family court declined to make the requested 
findings, concluding that Bianka M.’s alleged father was a 
necessary party to the proceedings and that the superior court 
lacked personal jurisdiction over him.158 Before the California 
Court of Appeal, Bianka M. argued that a state court was 
required to make SIJS findings at any time upon request.159 The 
California Court of Appeal rejected this argument and observed 
that “an order containing SIJ findings will not be useful to Bianka 
unless it is issued in the context of a bona fide custody 
proceeding.”160 The appellate court also found that “[b]ecause  
554–56 (Ct. App. 2015) (holding that although the child lived with his mother in the 
United States, the statute was satisfied because his father had abandoned him). 
 155 See, e.g., In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 641 (remains the law in the state 
of Nebraska). 
 156 Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. Reptr. 3d 849, 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2016), rev’d, 423 P.3d 334 (Cal. 2018). 
 157 Id. at 853–54. 
 158 The family court concluded that the juvenile’s request for an award of sole 
custody to her mother in a UPA action necessarily required the court to determine 
paternity and her father’s parental rights Id. at 854. The custody order “made [the 
juvenile’s alleged father] an indispensable party to the parentage action [under the 
UPA].” Id. Additionally, the court was also concerned that it did not have personal 
jurisdiction over the minor’s father to render any order affecting his parental rights. Id. 
 159 Id. at 861. 
 160 Id. at 864. 
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Bianka’s parentage action . . . appears to have been brought only 
to obtain SIJ findings, the proceeding below was not a bona fide 
custody proceeding under the [Uniform Parentage Act].”161 
The Court of Appeal in Bianka M. interpreted SIJS law to 
require that superior courts may only make SIJS findings “in the 
context of ongoing, bona fide proceedings relating to child welfare, 
rather than through specially constructed proceedings designed 
mainly for the purpose of issuing orders containing SIJ findings.”162 
Federal law, however, imposes no such “bona fide” requirement 
during adjudication of state court SIJS petitions. Thus, Bianka M. 
effectively invaded the federal government’s authority to regulate 
immigration by creating additional predicate findings for 
California SIJS applicants that a similarly situated applicant in 
another state would not be required to obtain. 
The California State Supreme Court subsequently 
reversed the intermediate court’s decision in Bianka M.163 In 
doing so, however, the California State Supreme Court did not 
conclude that the Court of Appeal had overstepped its authority 
and invaded the province of the federal government in 
interpreting the language of SIJS.164 Instead, the California 
Supreme Court grounded its analysis in California state law.165 
The failure of the California Supreme Court to even acknowledge 
that the intermediate appellate court’s opinion represented a 
clear overreach into federal authority to interpret SIJS leaves 
open the possibility that California state courts may in the future 
continue to exceed their authority with respect to SIJS. 
 3. Erick M. and Bianka M.: Why the SIJS Bifurcated 
State-Federal Structure is Inherently Flawed 
Both Erick M. and the intermediate appellate court’s 
decision in Bianka M. are emblematic of the problems inherent 
in the SIJS bifurcated state-federal structure. First, although 
Congress delegated authority to the states to make certain 
juvenile court SIJS eligibility findings, the statute does not 
delegate authority to interpret the Immigration and Nationality 
Act to the states. Second, these cases demonstrate that genuine 
 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 860. 
 163 See Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 423 P.3d 334, 336 (Cal. 2018). 
 164 Id. at 340–45 n.5 (concluding as a matter of state law that the court of appeal 
erred in concluding that Bianka M.’s SIJS petition could not proceed in absence of her 
biological father). 
 165 Id. at 343–46 (finding that under the California Code of Civil Procedure, 
section 155, the state court must issue SIJS findings, if factually supported, regardless of 
the trial court’s assessment of the child’s motivations in invoking the court’s jurisdiction). 
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disparities will arise among the states that overreach and 
interpret federal immigration law, which ultimately leads to 
disparate geographic access to SIJS, and, most significantly, 
unequal treatment among SIJS applicants based on the fortuity 
of where they seek state court SIJS findings. 
The structure of SIJS that allows state courts to interpret 
the federal law differently leads to unequal treatment of SIJS 
applicants and makes SIJS subject to an equal protection 
challenge under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
This situation does not present the classic Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause problem in which a state 
government discriminates against similarly situated state 
residents in a way that offends equal protection.166 Indeed, every 
SIJS applicant in Nebraska who is similarly situated to Erick M. 
will be treated the same by the Nebraska courts. For our 
purposes, the relevant comparison is between a SIJS applicant, 
as in the case of Erick M., who lived in Nebraska and could be 
reunited with only one parent, but is denied SIJS findings based 
on the state of Nebraska’s interpretation of SIJS, and a similarly 
situated SIJS applicant who lives in another state that has 
deferred interpretation to the federal government and are thus 
found to be SIJS eligible in a state court. This is not a problem that 
can be effectively attacked under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.167 Instead, the equal protection problem here 
arises because of the federal government’s actions. 
DHS has no authority under SIJS to grant a SIJS 
application if the applicant does not obtain the requisite state 
court predicate findings.168 Specifically, in those states where the 
state court has interpreted the federal law in a way that denies 
access to SIJS, then the predicate findings will not be obtained. 
DHS has no legal authority to review a state court’s refusal to 
issue SIJS findings, even in situations (such as in Erick M. and 
Bianka M.) where the denial is based on the state’s 
interpretation of federal law.169 Thus, DHS will be required as a 
 
 166 See supra note 64. 
 167 See supra text accompanying note 33. Given that the analysis is similar in 
terms of the outcome it should not matter whether action is held to violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment due process provision. 
 168 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012). 
 169 See Memorandum from William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. for Operations, U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., to Reg’l Dirs. & Dist. Dirs. (May 27, 2004), https://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/Archives%201998-2008/
2004/sij_memo_052704.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CL9-6RCA]; Memorandum from Lori Scialabba, 
Deputy Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., to January Contrera, Citizenship & Immigr. 
Servs. Ombudsman (July 13, 2011), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Citizenship-and-
Immigration-Services-Ombudsman-Recommendation-Special-Immigrant-Juvenile-
Adjudications.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK9C-UGRS]. 
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matter of law to reject the SIJS application out of hand, even 
though had that same applicant resided in a different state the 
application would have been granted. Thus, because of the 
structure of SIJS, the DHS will treat similarly situated SIJS 
applicants from different states unequally. 
In enacting SIJS, Congress chose to extend its privileges 
to every applicant who was eligible, and having done so, the 
federal government cannot deny those privileges based on the 
fortuity of where the applicant applied. When Congress acts, as 
it did when it enacted the SIJS legal framework, the 
Constitution requires that the law comports with Fifth 
Amendment principles of equal protection and due process. SIJS 
does not satisfy those principles. 
B. Why the Equal Protection Challenge Should Succeed 
As discussed elsewhere here,170 Plyler introduced the idea 
that undocumented children are particularly vulnerable and thus 
the laws that discriminate against them are subject to some level 
of judicial scrutiny higher than rational basis; the court required 
that the government show that the discrimination satisfied a 
“substantial” state goal.171 Thus, notwithstanding the deference 
otherwise granted to the executive and congressional branches in 
the area of immigration,172 deference to Congress and the 
executive does not insulate discriminatory immigration laws from 
the judicial scrutiny under equal protection principles. 
Furthermore, although this article proposes a novel and 
unique application of the equal protection doctrine, no 
meritorious counterargument exists that might undermine the 
equal protection challenge presented here. The equal protection 
injury at issue—that SIJS’s framework lacks uniform legal 
guidance, allowing states to interpret federal law inconsistently, 
which ultimately causes the federal government to apply SIJS  
 170 See supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text. 
 171 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982). 
 172 In deference to the plenary power in the area of immigration to the other 
branches of the federal government, courts typically apply rational basis review to 
discriminatory immigration laws that, if enacted by a state, would trigger strict scrutiny. 
See, e.g., Halaim v. INS, 358 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[B]ecause federal authority 
in the areas of immigration and naturalization is plenary, ‘[f]ederal classifications 
distinguishing among groups of aliens . . . are valid unless wholly irrational.’”) (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1464 (9th Cir. 1985); 
see also Lawrence v. Holder, 717 F.3d 1036, 1041 n.9 (9th Cir. 2013) (addressing a “half-
hearted” equal protection argument, the court noted that Congress can “draw lines that 
specify effective dates when it enacts or amends relief statutes.”); Hernandez-Mezquita v. 
Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 1161, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2002) (filing deadline for NACARA relief did not 
violate equal protection); Perez-Oropeza v. INS, 56 F.3d 43, 45–46 (9th Cir. 1995) (limited 
eligibility for family unity waiver did not violate equal protection). 
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unequally—is harm unlike those that the federal courts 
traditionally countenance. Indeed, there are some instances 
where the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have 
tolerated variation in statutory and constitutional interpretations 
of the law among the courts.173 This resembles none of them. 
 For example, “[n]o court has ever held that the mere 
existence of a circuit split on an issue of statutory interpretation 
violates due process or equal protection.”174 Courts recognize that 
disagreements among the federal circuit courts often lead to a 
review by the Supreme Court,175 and thus circuit splits are 
tolerated in part because they are temporary.176 At least in the 
case of criminal defendants, circuits splits are accepted as a 
rational consequence of their conviction.177 In contrast, the SIJS 
cases involve minors, not criminal defendants. Moreover, the 
problem with the interpretation of SIJS does not involve differing 
interpretations and applications of the law among federal 
circuits—it involves a split among the states’ interpretation of 
federal law. As the Erick M. case demonstrates, the situation is 
not temporary. Erick M. is the law in Nebraska and all similarly 
situated SIJS applicants in Nebraska are bound by it.178 
In addition, this problem does not involve the 
interpretation or application of federal regulations. When 
reviewing challenges to administrative agencies’ interpretations 
of laws they implement, the federal courts defer under Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council to the agencies 
unless their interpretation violates “the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.”179 
Likewise, this is not a situation where variation in the 
interpretation of the law should be tolerated because a state is 
simply interpreting state law. In general, the federal courts 
defer to the interpretation of state law by the state’s highest 
court on matters of state law.180 
 
 173 See infra text accompanying note 175. 
 174 Habibi v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting contention 
that the differing application of the law in different circuits violates equal protection). 
 175 See, e.g., Graham v. United States, No. CV-91-4112, 1992 WL 141998, at *7 
(E.D.N.Y. June 4, 1992) (“The Supreme Court commonly grants certiorari to heal circuit splits.”). 
 176 Id. at *9; see also Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster Cty., 488 U.S. 
336, 343 (1989) (inequalities between tax rates would not violate equal protection if they 
were temporary, since “the constitutional requirement is the seasonable attainment of a 
rough equality”). 
 177 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Gilkey, 242 F. Supp. 2d 549, 554 (S.D. Ill. 2001) (observing 
that a criminal defendant’s equal protection rights are not violated on the ground that 
“similarly situated” defendants are treated differently as a result of a circuit split). 
 178 In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 648 (Neb. 2012). 
 179 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 180 See e.g., Cent. Union Tel. Co. v. Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190, 195 (1925) 
(upholding Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation of a state waiver rule, even though 
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The deference afforded to state courts to interpret state 
law has been recognized even in the context of SIJS. In 2008, in 
Perez-Olano v. Gonzalez, a class of SIJS applicants challenged, 
inter alia, the “age-out” regulations in SIJS law.181 They argued 
that the regulations violated the Equal Protection Clause 
because in some states the process of obtaining SIJS state court 
predicate findings took so long that by the time applicants 
received those findings they were no longer eligible under state 
law, i.e., they had aged out of the state dependency system, and 
thus could no longer receive SIJS predicate findings from the 
state.182 The district court rejected all of the plaintiffs’ arguments 
challenging the “age-out” regulations, afforded the regulations 
deference under Chevron, and concluded that the SIJS 
regulations were uniform and rational.183 With respect to the 
equal protection claim, the court dispatched in a footnote that 
the problem for the SIJS applicants was not that the federal 
government had engaged in differential treatment in the 
application of the federal regulations, or that the states had 
interpreted the federal regulations in a manner that failed to 
comply with the federal law.184 Instead, the plaintiffs’ complaint 
centered on the state’s interpretation and application of the 
state’s dependency law, which the court implicitly concluded did 
 
that interpretation resulted in the forfeiture of federal constitutional rights; refusing to 
supplant Illinois law with a federal definition of waiver, the Supreme Court explained 
that the state court’s declaration “should bind us unless so unfair or unreasonable in its 
application to those asserting a federal right as to obstruct it.”). 
 181 Perez-Olano v. Gonzalez, 248 F.R.D. 248, 252 (C.D. Cal. 2008). In Perez-
Olano, the plaintiffs’ primary challenge to the “age-out” regulations was that they 
“impose[d] additional eligibility requirements unauthorized by the statute.” Id. at 268–
69. They also challenged the government’s policy requiring in-custody minors to obtain 
ICE’s specific consent, contending that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) did not authorize the 
defendants to acquire specific consent for a SIJS-predicate order because such orders do 
not “determine the custody status or placement” of an in-custody minor. Id. at 263–67. 
As they existed when Perez-Olano was decided, 
8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(1) preclude[d] SIJ classification once a youth [was] no 
longer “under twenty-one years of age.” [The regulation] require[d] that a 
youth seeking SIJ status “continue to be dependent upon the juvenile court 
and eligible for long-term foster care, such declaration, dependency or 
eligibility not having been vacated, terminated, or otherwise ended . . . .” 
Similarly, for SIJ-based adjustment of status, 8 C.F.R. §§ 205.1(a)(3)(iv)(A, C, 
& D) revoke[d] a youth’s SIJ classification “[u]pon the beneficiary reaching the 
age of 21; . . . the termination of the beneficiary’s dependency upon the juvenile 
court; . . . [or] the termination of the [youth’s] eligibility for long-term foster 
care.” 
Id. at 267. 
 182 Id. at 269 n.14. 
 183 Id. at 269. 
 184 Id. at 269 n.14. 
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not represent a violation of equal protection guarantees.185 In 
contrast, here, the equal protection problem originates from 
states’ differing interpretations of federal law, which was not an 
issue in Perez-Olano v. Gonzalez. 
Finally, the problem presented in this article does not fall 
within the narrow category of criminal cases, notably in the 
federal habeas context, where the federal courts often defer to 
the state court application of federal law.186 The deference to the 
state courts’ interpretations in the criminal habeas context is by 
design; it stems from the large role the state courts play in the 
criminal justice system compared to the more limited role of 
federal courts.187 Nonetheless, although the federal courts defer 
to the state courts in the context of habeas, even that deference 
has its limits—the federal court will grant relief where the state 
court’s action violates constitutional rights.188 And that is exactly 
the situation presented here—the state courts interpreting SIJS 
in a way that results in a violation of the Constitution’s 
guarantee of equal protection. Indeed, SIJS was intended to 
serve a fair, uniform, and unitary nationwide process for UAC to 
seek protected status under federal immigration law. The states 
were not invited into the process to place their own unique spin 
 
 185 Id. Perez-Olano was settled in 2010 and the settlement updated again in 
2015. As part of the settlement, the class members who had been deprived of SIJS 
findings based on the age-out provision were eligible to reopen their SIJS cases with the 
DHS. See Settlement Agreement at 8, Perez-Olano v. Holder, 2:05-cv-03604-DDP-RZ 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2010) (No. 2:05-CV-3604), ECF. No. 159-1; see also William 
Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
457, § 235, 122 Stat 5044, 5074–82 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2012); 
Stipulation Settling Motion for Class Wide Enforcement of Settlement at 2–6, Perez-
Olano v. Holder, 2:05-cv-03504-DDP-RZ (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015) (No. 2:05-CV-3604), ECF 
No. 186, http://immigrantchildren.org/PDF/186%2003-04-15%20Perez%20Olano%20-
%20STIPULATION%20SETTLING%20MOTION%20FOR%20CLASS-%20WIDE%20
ENFORCEMENT%20OF%20SETTLEMENT.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H4C-BPDT]. 
 186 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976) (Recognizing that “there is ‘no 
intrinsic reason why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more 
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to [federal law] than his neighbor in 
the state courthouse’”) (quoting Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal 
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 509 (1963)). 
 187 Habeas relief will be granted if the petitioner demonstrates that the state 
court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012). This “‘highly deferential standard’” 
is “‘difficult to meet,’ because the purpose . . . is to ensure that federal habeas relief 
functions as a ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’ 
‘and not as a means of error correction.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180 (2011) 
(citation omitted); Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 
562 U.S. 86, 102–03 (2011)). “The Court is not to determine whether the court of appeals’s 
decision was correct or whether this Court may have reached a different outcome.” Larson 
v. Patterson, No. 2:09-CV-989-PMW, 2011 WL 129485, at *1 (D. Utah Jan. 14, 2011) (citing 
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75–76 (2003)). “The role of federal habeas proceedings, 
while important in assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and 
limited.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983). 
 188 See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003). 
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on the federal law; rather, when originally enacted, the states 
were included in the framework simply because the drafters 
believed that state courts had the family law expertise and 
experience needed to make the predicate factual findings 
relevant to the eligibility determination.189 As has been shown, 
however, in cases such as Erick M. and Bianka M., the state 
courts have overstepped that authority. Thus, SIJS applicants, 
similar to Erick M.190, have no recourse except to assert a federal 
equal protection claim because their highest state court has 
interpreted the federal law in a way that is unfair and forecloses 
their access to the federal privileges of SIJS.191 
Admittedly, this novel proposal—asserting an equal 
protection challenge—to achieve reform of an entire framework of 
federal law and the arguments offered in support of this idea is 
without precedent in the context of SIJS. It is not, however, 
entirely without analogical support in the canon of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence. A useful comparison can be drawn between 
the equal protection harms here and those that the Supreme 
Court found in Bush v. Gore.192 The majority in Bush v. Gore 
identified the Florida Supreme Court’s failure to formulate 
uniform rules and specific standards for the counties to use to 
determine voter intent as the reason the state court’s recount 
procedures violated the Equal Protection Clause.193 The Florida 
Supreme Court had baked in uncertainty and ambiguity in the 
vote counting process, allowing counties in Florida to apply their 
individual legal standards, leading, according to the majority of 
the Supreme Court, to the unequal evaluation of the ballots across 
the state.194 SIJS suffers from the same failings. SIJS’ bifurcated, 
state-federal power-sharing framework, as well the language of 
SIJS, have given the states too much space to interpret the SIJS 
law and to create legal standards based on state interpretation of 
 
 189 See supra note 87. 
 190 In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 639 (Neb. 2012). 
 191 This point is clearly illustrated in the case of Nebraska after Erick M. In 
2014, two years after the Nebraska Supreme Court decided Erick M., USCIS, the agency 
charged with administering the Act, including applications for SIJS, took the position 
that abuse, neglect or abandonment by one parent was sufficient for purposes of SIJS 
predicate findings. See Immigration Relief for Abused Children, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGR. SERVS. at 1 (Apr. 2014), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/
Green%20Card/Green%20Card%20Through%20a%20Job/Immigration_Relief_for_Ab
used_Children-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YPB-2UUH] (providing that SIJ-eligible 
children may “[b]e living with a foster family, an appointed guardian, or the non-abusive 
parent”). This notwithstanding, the Nebraska Supreme court’s interpretation of the “one 
or both” parent language—now at odds with the USCIS view—remains the law for SIJS 
applicants in Nebraska. 
 192 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000). 
 193 Id. at 105–08. 
 194 Id. at 106. 
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federal law, ultimately leading to the unequal application of 
federal law. There is no conceivable rational basis to justify the 
unequal treatment of SIJS applicants; there is no interest, 
substantial or otherwise, that it serves. Following Bush v. Gore, 
therefore, SIJS violates equal protection.  
IV. IF NOT BEFORE, WHY NOW? 
Interestingly, none of the immigration scholars researching 
and writing passionately about SIJS’ failings and potential fixes 
have suggested an equal protection challenge to it. Legal research 
has revealed that among the numerous legal attacks on SIJS 
mounted since its enactment almost thirty years ago, an equal 
protection challenge has been asserted only once in Perez-Olano v. 
Gonzalez, which claimed that SIJS’s “age-out” provision violated 
the equal protection doctrine only as an adjunct and alternative 
argument to its primary attack on the regulation.195 
Why is that the case? If, as this article posits, an equal 
protection problem is ingrained in SIJS, and the entire framework 
of the law is susceptible to a successful equal protection challenge, 
why has the claim not been proposed in the scholarship or 
litigated before now? 
Maybe it has not been asserted because the question 
presented is too complicated, i.e., does a violation of the 
constitutional right to equal protection of the law result when a 
state actor interprets the federal law in a way that causes a 
federal actor to apportion federal benefits unequally? This is a 
difficult question to pose, let alone answer. Or maybe the 
challenge has escaped attention for prudential reasons, such as 
when the identity of the defendants is not clear. Alternatively, it 
could be that scholars and advocates that are usually focused on 
the intricacies of immigration law (rather than constitutional law) 
have simply not considered asserting an equal protection claim. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that immigration law 
advocates have previously considered equal protection claims but 
decided against asserting them because of the risk associated 
with attacking the entire SIJS framework. They may fear that the 
courts might invalidate the law in its entirety—“throw the baby 
out with the bath water”196—leaving all unaccompanied, 
 
 195 See Perez-Olano v. Gonzalez, 248 F.R.D. 248, 262–69 (C.D. Cal. 2008); see 
also supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 196 This idiom derives from a German proverb, “das Kind mit dem Bade 
ausschütten.” This phrase first appeared in 1512, in Narrenbeschwörung (Appeal to 
Fools) by Thomas Murner. Michael Quinion, Newsletter 826, WORLD WIDE WORDS (Apr. 
6, 2013), http://www.worldwidewords.org/nl/ohfq.htm [https://perma.cc/WDG5-8GPW]. 
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undocumented children with no opportunity to remain in the 
United States legally.197 This fear is genuine. Nonetheless, given 
the anti-immigrant political sentiments expressed during the 
2016 election cycle, the Trump administration’s attempts to end 
DACA, its “zero tolerance” immigration policy, the open hostility 
expressed by members of the executive branch towards the 
undocumented community, and the lack of political will and 
inaction in Congress, non-litigation options are not viable.198 In 
addition, given the climate of deregulation that currently prevails 
in federal agencies,199 the SIJS as we have known it for more than 
twenty-five years may soon no longer exist. Consequently, there 
is nothing left to lose by asserting an equal protection challenge 
to the SIJS framework. 
Challenges to federal government actions based on the 
Equal Protection Clause are increasing.200 They are the new 
black.201 In the last eighteen months, equal protection challenges 
have been filed to enjoin a number of the executive branch’s 
actions and the federal courts have not hesitated to review the 
merits of these cases.202 The moment for an equal protection 
challenge to SIJS has arrived. No time like the present. 
 
 197 Given the recent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, this fear is not 
entirely unjustified. See e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1701 (2017). 
In Morales-Santana, the Supreme Court held the different treatment of unmarried 
fathers and unmarried mothers in, 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2012), with regard to the required 
length of physical presence, was an equal-protection violation. Id. at 1696–1701. The 
Court, however, disagreed with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
on the appropriate remedy for this violation. Rather than choosing to extend the benefits 
of § 1409(c) to Mr. Morales-Santana and others disadvantaged by the equal-protection 
violation, the Court held that withdrawing the benefits of § 1409(c) from those to whom 
it applied was more consistent with Congressional intent, because § 1409(c) was merely 
an exception to the broader and stricter rule of 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7). Id. at 1699. “Going 
forward,” the Court said, “Congress may address the issue and settle on a uniform 
prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender.” 
Id. at 1701. Until Congress does so, however, the Court held that “[i]n the 
interim . . . § 1401(a)(7)’s now-five-year requirement should apply, prospectively, to 
children born to unwed U.S.-citizen mothers.” Id. This notwithstanding, as described 
supra note 141, here plaintiffs might request an injunction prohibiting unconstitutional 
applications or a holding that consistency with legislative intent requires invalidating a 
section of the law that offends equal protection and in so doing seek a narrow remedy 
with preserves the entitlement intended by the legislature in promulgating SIJS. 
 198 See supra Section II.B.3.b. 
 199 Tracking Deregulation in the Trump Era, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 20, 
2017), https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/tracking-deregulation-in-the-trump-
era/ [https://perma.cc/J588-J5HN]. 
 200 See supra notes 4–11. 
 201 Because “black” is always in style in the fashion industry, proclaiming that 
something is “the new black” means that it is the hottest new thing. This phrase is no 
longer limited to the world of fashion; it highlights the “coolness” of anything. The New 
Black, FARLEX DICTIONARY OF IDIOMS (2015), https://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/the+
new+black [https://perma.cc/9KQQ-6XGV]. 
 202 Indeed, the litigation of President Trump’s travel ban provides an example 
where the courts have shown a willingness to decide the outer limits of discrimination 
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CONCLUSION 
The values embodied in the equal protection doctrine—
that similarly situated people will be accorded equal treatment 
under the law—are central to American democracy. Likewise, and 
undeniably, the United States has always been a nation of 
immigrants—they have been given equal protection under the 
law and fair access to the privileges to which they are entitled. 
These ideals, however, are under siege. The current executive and 
legislative branches are not only ineffective in safeguarding the 
equal protection rights of immigrants but are also leading the 
attacks on them. Consequently, as discussed in the SIJS example, 
when equal protection concerns arise based on states’ inconsistent 
interpretations and application of the federal laws, in conjunction 
with the hostility from the executive and legislative branches, 
resorting to the courts is the only viable option to vindicate those 
rights. Although the problems in the SIJS framework are inborn, 
existing since the law’s enactment, given the tremendous increase 
in immigration of unaccompanied immigrant minors to the 
United States in the last five years, it is crunch time for 
addressing the problems in SIJS. Since 2016, the federal courts 
have shown a greater willingness to consider equal protection 
challenges to government action. Thus, an equal protection 
challenge to SIJS is viable and ripe. It is time to strike while the 
iron is hot—the Trump era demands nothing less. 
 
in the name of national security. The Ninth Circuit confirmed that “evidence of purpose 
beyond the face of the challenged law may be considered in evaluating Establishment 
and Equal Protection Clause claims.” Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167–68 
(9th Cir. 2017) (finding that President Trump’s statements regarding a “Muslim ban” 
raised “serious allegations and presented significant constitutional questions,” although 
it ultimately reserved consideration of plaintiffs’ equal protection claim). 
